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INTRODUCTION
The emergence of new technologies within society is often met with a profound
sense of optimism. It is never long until the initial optimism wears off, only to be replaced
with pessimism. Throughout history – from the printing press to the radio - new forms of
mass communication have been praised for their “unprecedented” potential to promote
democratic governance...each inevitably fails to deliver on that promise. In the early 2000s,
the Web 2.0 Revolution provided techno-optimists with a new set of technologies upon
which to place their belief in the greater good of humanity. In the decade since the Arab
Spring, it has become increasingly clear that Web 2.0 technologies do not hold the kind of
democratic potential that warrants blind faith. However, they do possess something
distinctly different from previous innovations in mass communication that enable those of
us with optimistic tendencies to question whether this time will be different.
Whereas Web 1.0 was one-dimensional in that users could post, share, and consume
information without meaningful interactive capabilities, Web 2.0 is almost entirely
categorized by its participatory nature. The specifics of which technologies and platforms
are considered part of Web 2.0 are largely irrelevant. What is important are the values and
norms ushered in by the Web 2.0 Revolution: participation, user-generated or
crowdsourced content, and interactive/multi-way communication.1 All of which seems to
suggest an inherent bias toward democratic ideals.

1. Ashraf Darwish and Kamaljit I. Lakhtaria, “The Impact of the New Web 2.0
Technologies in Communication, Development, and Revolutions of Societies,” Journal
of Advances in Information Technology vol. 2:4 (2011): 204.
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The unfortunate reality is that 2021 marks the eleventh consecutive year of global
democratic backsliding.2 This is in part due to the ways in which digital technologies have
made it easier and more efficient for authoritarian governments to exercise control over
their populations. At the same time, it is also true that digital technologies currently possess
the potential to promote democratic practice in ways never before possible. It is here that
a dichotomy has emerged between the liberating potential of digital technology and its
repressive affordances.
Ultimately, scholars have begun to ask: “Do the Internet, social media, mobile
phones, and their exploding array of applications empower citizens to mobilize for freedom
and accountability, or do these technologies empower autocracies to better monitor and
effectively neutralize pro-democracy movements and dissidents?”3 A wide range of work
has been published in the last decade exploring the intersection of the dichotomy. This
thesis does not seek to add to that body of work. Rather, this thesis asks more specifically
if it is possible for digital technologies to promote democratic practices under nondemocratic regimes.
Through a review of the current literature, it found that a singular technology can
at once be liberatory while simultaneously serving to counter its own liberating potential.
As a result, repressive regimes have been able to successfully push back against mass
mobilization and quell efforts to bring greater transparency and accountability to systems

2. Sarah Repucci and Amy Slipowitz, “Freedom in the World 2021,” Freedom House
(2021): 2.
3. Larry Diamond, “Introduction,” In Liberation Technology: Social Media and the
Struggle for Democracy, edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Maryland: The
Johns Hopkins University Press and the National Endowment for Democracy, 2012): x.
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of governance. The case of Egypt is used to explore mass mobilization and the right to
freedom of expression before, during, and after the Egyptian Revolution through the lens
of often flawed digital technology. Subsequently, the case of Tanzania is used to examine
the potential for digital crowdsourcing platforms to provide accountability and
transparency during elections in the face of increasing legal and technological limitations.
These case studies enable the identification of a series of limiting factors contributing to
the narrowing potential for digital technologies in democratic advocacy. Importantly, these
case studies also allow for the identification of strategic opportunities for the international
community, civil society, local activists, private sector companies, technologists, and
citizens to engage in the promotion of digital rights that enable digital technologies to
promote democratic practices under non-democratic regimes.
Noam Chomsky said: “Unless you believe that the future can be better, you are
unlikely to step up and take responsibility for making it so.” That is the basis of this thesis.
In an effort to reclaim agency in the global battle between digital democracy and digital
authoritarianism, this thesis asks: What, if anything, can be done?

7

CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW
In the opening of Blown to Bits: Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness After
the Digital Explosion, authors Hal Abelson, Harry Lewis, and Ken Ledeen attest to how,
“The digital explosion is changing the world as much as printing once did -- and some of
the changes are catching us unaware, blowing to bits our assumptions about the way the
world works...The explosion, and the social disruption that it will create, have barely
begun.”4 The digital explosion is just the most recent iteration of technological advances
that entirely alter human civilization. In her book entitled The Ethics of Innovation, Sheila
Jasanoff argues that the current conceptualization of technology “as a means to a
preordained end” does not allow for an exploration of the complex relationship that human
civilizations have forged with technological instruments.5 From the invention of fire to the
invention of Facebook, theories of technology lay at the heart of what it means for society
to create, adopt, and make use of new inventions.
Once integrated into society, technologies possess a multitude of functions, effects,
and meanings.6 The sole function or intended “primary use” of a technology dreamed up
by its inventor will not be the only use that society finds for the technology. Through his
work at the intersection of democracy and technology, Richard Sclove lays the theoretical
foundation through which the majority of this section’s argument rests. Sclove’s
conception of technology is crucial to the basic foundation of this thesis in that it goes

4. Hal Abelson, Ken Ledeen, and Harry Lewis, Blown to Bits: Your Life Liberty, and
Happiness after the Digital Explosion (Boston: Pearson, 2008), 3.
5. Sheila Jasanoff, The Ethics of Invention: Technology and the Human Future (New
York: W.W. Norton, 2016), 211.
6. Richard Sclvoe, Democracy and Technology (New York: The Guilford Press, 1995),
20.
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beyond the simple notion that technology is created for a primary use but rather that
technologies exhibit secondary uses and secondary impacts. One singular technology can,
and will, be used in many different ways for many different purposes.
In his revolutionary book Democracy and Technology, Richard Sclove presents the
critical argument that technologies qualify as forms of “social structure.” Sclove suggests
that technologies ultimately function within society in terms of their political and cultural
implications, similarly to that of more traditional social structures such as family and
religion.7 Defining technologies in terms of social structures is useful for the purposes of
this thesis in that, as Sclove contends, “social structures are also ambiguous in that while
they can restrict opportunities in some respects, they can - when appropriately designedenhance them in others.”8
The impact that Sclove’s argument has on the foundation of this thesis is twofold.
Firstly, if one accepts the assertion that technologies possess primary and secondary uses,
it can be implied that society, rather than the inventor, creates the conditions for such
secondary uses. Secondly, upon the adoption of Sclove’s suggestion that technologies, as
social structures, accrue a multiplicity of potential impacts, this thesis proposes the notion
that one singular technology can possess uses beyond those intended by its creator, and
therefore one singular technology can impact society in more than one way. As such,
technology’s impact on society is not black or white – neither liberatory nor repressive –
and does not inherently enhance autocratic governance, nor does it inherently enhance
democratic practices. Digital technologies can do both at the same time. Thus, it is

7. Sclvoe, Democracy and Technology, 11.
8. Sclvoe, Democracy and Technology, 13.
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important for society to better understand the ways in which technology can support
autocracy and democratic practices. If the distinction can be understood, there is more
opportunity to better support and invest in the areas where technology has the ability to
promote democratic practices such as freedom of expression, political contestation, human
rights, transparency, and accountability.
Critical to this argument is the claim that, although technologies impact society in
a multitude of different ways, the structural impact that technologies have on society is
inherently disparate and dependent on usage—by whom and for what ends. 9 Ultimately,
this thesis will discuss certain technologies and not others reliant on the notion that some
technologies have greater cultural and political impacts. For the purposes of this thesis,
digital technologies will be seen as having greater cultural and political impacts than other
forms of technology. While technologies such as the printing press have had monumental
cultural and political impacts on society, the timely position of this thesis warrants a deeper
exploration of digital technologies as we are only just beginning to understand the potential
positive and negative impacts they possess within the scope of democratic governance.
Sclove himself argues that “recognizing the many respects in which technologies
contribute to defining who people are, what they can and cannot do, and how they
understand themselves and their world should dispel the common myth that technologies
are morally or politically neutral.”10 Bernholz and Landemore offer a useful definition for
digital technology that will aid in limiting the scope of technology explored in this thesis.
Through specifically pinpointing the term digital technology to define a “set of information

9. Sclvoe, Democracy and Technology, 27.
10. Sclvoe, Democracy and Technology, 17.
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and communication technologies that make use of the networked electronic generation,
processing, and storage of data,” Bernholz and Landemore provide a vehicle through which
to narrow the scope of this thesis. 11
An important question to ask is what, if anything, makes digital technologies
different from other waves of technological innovation in human history? First and
foremost, as Diebert and Rohozinsku articulate, the speed with which digital ICTs have
spread around the world in a relatively short amount of time is previously unmatched in
human history.12 Whereas previous forms of mass communication such as newspapers,
television, and radio have a history of government intervention and centralized control,
digital ICTs are distinct in that they enable real-time multi-directional channels of
communication on a large scale without a centralized authority. 13 In the consumption of
information, digital ICTs shift citizens away from being passive recipients and toward a
more participatory form of communication. 14 Joseph Siegle captured the importance of this
new moment brought about by digital technologies:
For the first time, individuals even in remote areas are able to receive and
communicate information in real time, usually via cell phones and SMS given their
greater affordability, thereby connecting them to their compatriots and with the rest
of the world. This is a major departure from previous eras. The ready access
individuals now have to multiple opinions versus the dominant narrative that
11. Lucy Bernholz, Hélène Landemore, and Rob Reich, Digital Technology and
Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2021), 7.
12. Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski, “Liberation vs. Control: The Future of
Cyberspace,” in Liberation Technology: Social Media and the Struggle for Democracy,
ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press
and the National Endowment for Democracy, 2012), 18.
13. Kris Ruijgrok, “From the web to the streets: internet and protests under authoritarian
regimes,” Democratization vol. 24:3 (2017), 501.
14. Larry Diamond, “Liberation Technology,” in Liberation Technology: Social Media
and the Struggle for Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Maryland:
The Johns Hopkins University Press and the National Endowment for Democracy, 2012),
5.
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governments have been able to maintain is changing state-society relations.
Governments simply cannot control messages the way they have in the past.
Instead, there are now “competing frames” of the state’s engagement with societal
priorities.15
While Sclove provides a useful framework through which to position technology
within the social and cultural spheres, Benjamin Barber provides a framework for the
exploration of technology's impact on society. Barber argues that citizens must take very
deliberate and conscious steps to consider the impact of technology-- that it is imperative
to take action in its implementation and application, particularly with respect to democratic
practices. Barber highlights what he refers to as the “Pangloss Scenario,” in which the
impacts of technology are left to market forces. In this scenario, the impact of technology
is governed by the market’s invisible hand, and it is believed that incentives of profit and
consumer interest will lead technology to positive end goals. 16 Here, Barber suggests that
democracy and democratic practices do not farewell. However, Barber is vocal about his
belief that the use of market forces to dictate technology’s impact on society is the path of
least resistance and that, given society’s current trajectory, this will likely end up steering
technology’s social, cultural, and political impacts in the long run. Barber’s view provides
ample grounds to suggest that society must take explicit action to promote the
strengthening of democratic practices and that technology must be at the center of that
solution as it will not do so left to its own devices.

15. Joseph Siegle, “ICT and Accountability in Areas of Limited Statehood,” in Bits and
Atoms: Information and Communication Technology in Areas of Limited Statehood, ed.
Steven Livingston and Gregor Walter-Drop (London: Oxford University Press, 2014), 65.
16. Benjamin R. Barber, “Three Scenarios for the Future of Technology and Strong
Democracy,” Political Science Quarterly vol. 113:4 (1999): 576.
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Both arguments presented by Sclove and Barber allude to what is often colloquially
referred to as technology’s “unintended consequences.” Jasanoff attests that “the bright
glams of promise that invite human societies to invest in technology march hand in hand
with darker misgivings about what could go wrong if the promises fail, and the unexpected
breakdown happens on a grand scale.” 17 The impacts of technology seem to present
themselves as a yin and yang-- the good along with the bad. However, as Jasanoff argues,
the language of “unintended consequences” is dangerous as it implies that any kind of
foreword thinking about technologies societal, cultural, and political impacts is useless and
provides the kind of framework that has allowed technologist like Mark Zuckerberg to
follow a “move fast and break things” mentality. 18 Moreover, the language of “unintended
consequences” removes the imperative for anyone to take responsibility for the impacts
that technologies have on society apart from their primary use. 19 As Jasanoff states, this
language further “reduce[s] us to helplessness, not knowing quite how to respond, let alone
how to mitigate the damage.”20 Though Sclove hints at the same phenomenon of
unintended consequences, his language of primary versus secondary uses and impacts
provides a clearer and more helpful framework through which to understand the
intersection of technologies and societal impacts. As Jasanoff notes, much like the yin and
yang of technological impacts, in order for there to be unintended consequences, there need
to be intended consequences, and as she asks: “What, after all, are technology’s intended

17. Sheila Jasanoff, The Ethics of Invention: Technology and the Human Future (New
York: W.W. Norton, 2016), 214.
18. Jasanoff, The Ethics of Invention, 23.
19. Jasanoff, The Ethics of Invention, 24.
20. Jasanoff, The Ethics of Invention, 24.
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consequences.”21 Jasanoff further highlights the reality that “good consequences are
always thought to be intended, and only bad outcomes are retrospectively labeled as
unintended.”22 If the term unintended fixes the creator’s intention on the side of good,
within the context of Sclove and Barber’s theories of technology, that one intended “good”
use will never exist in a static state as the uses, functions, and impacts of technology on
society are always evolving.
When considered within the context of technologies as social structure, Jasanoff’s
discussion of unintended consequences becomes crucial in that it allows for the placement
of agency. If technology is neither inherently liberatory nor repressive, it is neither
inherently pro-democracy nor pro-autocracy; thus, action can be taken to protect the
potential for digital technologies to promote democratic practice. This is most important
within the context of non-democratic regimes as digital technologies have provided access
to information in authoritarian regimes in a way that has never been possible before – even
when taking into account authoritarian leaders efforts to mitigate such flows of information
– whereas access to information in democracies has historically not been an impediment to
civic action.23
There has been a great deal of scholarship over the past decade postulating which
side of the spectrum digital technologies will ultimately land: will digital technology be
liberatory or repressive, and will they serve to promote democratic practices or be a tool
for autocratic regimes to further exercise control over their populations? This debate
centers around the dichotomic battle between “liberation technology” and “repression
21. Jasanoff, The Ethics of Invention, 24.
22. Jasanoff, The Ethics of Invention, 25.
23. Ruijgrok, “From the web to the streets,” 498.
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technology,” with liberation technology playing for democracy and repression technology
for autocracy. When considered within Jasanoff’s theory of “unintended consequences,”
liberation technology – while not necessarily an intended outcome of many digital
technologies and often in the form of Sclove’s secondary use framework – is portrayed as
an intended outcome, while repression technologies are considered to be unintended, and
thus the inventor is not held to account for such impacts. More recent scholarship has
started to explore the reality that the division between liberation and repression
technologies may not be so black and white. As Azer notes in research on the Arab Spring
in Egypt, “technology has been paradoxical, which means that a certain technology applied
in a certain way in a certain context may have consequences or implications of one kind,
and may necessarily and at once be implicated in a contrary set of consequences or
implications.”24 It is becoming increasingly clear that one technology may at once be both
liberatory and repressive. Diebert and Rohozinku are among the first to have written about
this notion and clearly articulated this finding, noting that “the very same technologies
which give voice to democratic activists living under authoritarian rule can also be
harnessed by their oppressors.”25 Ultimately, Diebert and Rohozinku contend that these
questions about technological impacts are inherently complex due to the fact that
technological systems are not “static artifact[s]” but rather “a constantly evolving domain
– a multilevel ecosystem of physical infrastructure, software, regulators, and ideas.” 26

24. Evronia Azer, Yingqin Zheng and G. Harindranath. "Paradoxes of Visibility: The
Inter-Play of Online Power Dynamics between Activists and the State in the Egyptian
Revolution." Mediterranean Conference on Information Systems 2018 Proceedings,
(2018): 2.
25. Deibert and Rohozinski, “Liberation vs. Control,” 19.
26. Deibert and Rohozinski, “Liberation vs. Control,” 20.
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In 2010 when the Journal of Democracy published Larry Diamond’s influential
article entitled “Liberation Technology,” the world was only just waking up to the potential
for digital technologies to promote democratic practices under non-democratic regimes. As
the mobile phone revolution and Internet-enabled devices spread rapidly outside of wealthy
Western democracies throughout the early to mid-2000s, secondary uses of these
technologies became increasingly evident. Diamond explains that digital technologies are
liberatory in so far as they can “empower individuals, facilitate independent
communication and mobilization, and strengthen an emergent civil society.” 27 However,
he also more specifically defines liberation technology as “any form of information and
communication technology (ICT) that can expand political, social, and economic
freedom.”28 In providing a lens through which citizens can access uncensored information,
digital technologies enable citizens to more accurately evaluate government performance
and engage in the global community, ultimately “[facilitating] democratic socialization.” 29
Diamond’s theory of liberation technology expands into digital technology’s ability to
function as “accountability technology.” Diamond argues that “liberation technology is
also ‘accountability technology,’ in that it provides efficient and powerful tools for
transparency and monitoring.”30 There are many modalities of accountability, but they all
rely upon access to reliable and independent information. In exploring this concept, Siegle
27. Larry Diamond, “Introduction,” In Liberation Technology: Social Media and the
Struggle for Democracy, edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Maryland: The
Johns Hopkins University Press and the National Endowment for Democracy, 2012): xii.
28. Diamond, “Liberation Technology,” 4.
29. Elizabeth Stoycheff, G. Scott Burgess, and Maria Clara Martucci. "Online Censorship
and Digital Surveillance: The Relationship between Suppression Technologies and
Democratization Across Countries." Information, Communication & Society, vol. 17 no.
1 (2018): 1 - 17. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2018.1518472.
30. Diamond, “Liberation Technology,” 10.
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writes that “information is the lifeblood of accountability.” 31 Through acting as a form of
accountability for governments and promoting access to independent information, ICTs
provide avenues for citizens to protest the status quo.
In his evaluation of the Internet’s ability to promote democratic practices under
forms of non-democratic governance, Ruijgrok finds that digital technologies impact the
promotion of democratic practices in four main ways: (1) By reducing the costs and risks
for those who may wish to speak out; (2) By allowing for “attitudinal change”; (3) By
enabling citizens to share in their discontent and wish for action; thus, lowering
informational uncertainty for those who may wish to speak out; and (4) By the mobilizing
effect of audiovisual content such as real-time images and videos shared online or via
SMS.32 Various works by other scholars confirm Ruijgrok’s findings.

(1) By reducing the costs and risks for those who may wish to speak out:
Prior to the digital revolution, the cost of collecting and disseminating information,
as well as the cost of coordinating citizen organization, served as substantive advantages
for regimes seeking to remain in control. 33 However, the introduction of Internet-based
devices, as well as mobile phones and broadband infrastructure, have significantly lowered
the cost of sharing information and have created an efficient and effective platform for
activists and ordinary citizens to coordinate collective action. 34 Moreover, the appearance

31. Siegle, “ICT and Accountability in Areas of Limited Statehood,” 64.
32. Ruijgrok, “From the web to the streets,” 499.
33. Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M Hussain, Democracy’s fourth wave?: digital
media and the Arab Spring (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 66.
34. Chun-Chin Chang and Thung-Hong Lin, “Autocracy log in: Internet censorship and
civil society in the digital age,” Democratization vol. 27:5 (2020), 875.
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of anonymity provided by online communication through tools like social media
networking platforms equips users with a perceived layer of protection from government
retribution unusual when undertaking stances of political opposition. 35

(2) By allowing for “attitudinal change”:
Ruijgrok argues that by introducing citizens to information that is distinct from
official government rhetoric or published by government-influenced media, digital ICTs
can alter citizen attitudes about government performance and legitimacy. 36 Specifically,
Ruijgrok notes that “as citizens are increasingly exposed to government failures, civic
debates, and alternative ideas, a more fertile ground for mobilization is likely to be created,
due to changing attitudes.”37 Bailard introduces two conceptual mechanisms called
“mirror-holding” and “window-opening” to explain how digital ICTs operate within nondemocratic or information-restricted regimes to promote democratic practices such as
political contestation, protest, and transparency and accountability in governance. Mirrorholding refers to the ability of various ICTs like the Internet to view one’s own government
more accurately through “its capacity to provide a larger and more diverse set of
information upon which to base an evaluation.” 38 Whereas “window-opening” refers to the
process by which citizens’ access to such information can “alter the criteria and
expectations that they consider in the course of arriving at those evaluations.” 39
35. Ruijgrok, “From the web to the streets,” 500.
36. Ruijgrok, “From the web to the streets,” 501-502.
37. Ruijgrok, “From the web to the streets,” 501-502.
38 Catie Snow Bailard, “A Field Experiment on the Internet’s Effect in an African
Election: Savvier Citizens, Disaffected Voters, or Both?” Journal of Communication vol.
62 (2012): 333.
39. Bailard, “A Field Experiment on the Internet’s Effect in an African Election,” 333.
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(3) By enabling citizens to share in their discontent and wish for action; thus, lowering
informational uncertainty for those who may wish to speak out:
The real-time spread of independent multi-way and peer-to-peer information can
function to minimize citizen fears both in terms of speaking out and taking action. 40
Through such communication, Siegle argues that ICTs serve to “[transform] what is a
solitary indignity and exploitative experience into a shared recognition that many others
have encountered similar circumstances. This experience is empowering to victims and the
society at large—diminishing their sense of helplessness—and providing them a tool by
which to take the initiative in redressing their grievance.”41

(4) By the mobilizing effect of real-time images and videos shared via digital means:
Another affordance of the inherent features of digital technologies as a tool is that
they “can induce emotional mobilization by transmitting visual information from sources
other than official propaganda.”42

Given the potential for digital technologies to empower opposition under nondemocratic regimes, many question why states attempting to clamp down on the promotion
of democratic practices would not simply remove the ability to access the Internet. The
short answer pointed toward in recent scholarship is that it is simply not an option.
However, the reality is not quite as straightforward. Rod and Weidmann explain that “the
Internet is not imposed on a particular country from the outside; rather its introduction
40. Ruijgrok, “From the web to the streets,” 502.
41. Siegle, “ICT and Accountability in Areas of Limited Statehood,” 67.
42. Chang and Lin, “Autocracy log in,” 875.
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relies critically on the permission and support of the domestic government.” 43 In the late
1990s and early 2000s, the economic benefits of Internet adoption were too large for
governments to ignore. Furthermore, in order to receive international aid from Western
democracies, refusing Internet adoption was not an option for many countries.44 Initially,
the effects of adopting a liberation technology like the Internet were not noticeable or
problematic for non-democratic regimes. However, as access increased and Internetenabled mobile phones became commonplace, the potential for digital technologies to
promote democratic practices under non-democratic regimes was a reality faced by many
states. Ultimately, as Diamond asserts, “technology is merely a tool, open to both noble
and nefarious purposes.”45 Thus, in order to retain the economic benefits for the domestic
economy as well as from the international community while still remaining in a position
of power, non-democratic regimes responded by countering the liberating effects of digital
technologies with their own, often digitally enabled, reactive measures.46
While many of the non-democratic regimes discussed in this thesis are not
consolidated autocracies, features of the “problem of authoritarian rule” as explored by
Rod and Weidmann provide a useful framework through which to conceptualize the
reactive measures taken by regimes in the face of liberation technologies. A central feature
of Rod and Weidmann’s exploration of the “problem of authoritarian rule” is “the problem
of mass control to prevent the rise of popular opposition leaders and uprisings.”47 Digital

43. Espen Geelmuyden Rod and Nils B. Weidmann, “Empowering activists or autocrats?
The Internet in authoritarian regimes,” Journal of Peace Research vol 52:3 (2015), 341.
44. Ruijgrok, “From the web to the streets,” 504.
45. Diamond, “Introduction,” xii.
46. Chang and Lin, “Autocracy log in,” 874.
47. Rod and Weidmann, “Empowering activists or autocrats?” 339.
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technologies make it more difficult for regimes to solve the “problem of authoritarian rule”
as it makes it easier and faster for information to effectively flow through the population
than ever before, making the fear of successful opposition candidates and mass uprisings a
credible threat to a regime’s position of power.48 As the control of information is an
essential feature for regimes seeking to remain in power, reactive measures attempting to
counter liberation technologies have predominantly centered around efforts to regain
control over the information ecosystem. 49
Due to the economic and political implications of draconian actions with respect to
digital technologies – the Internet in particular – states have created complex mechanisms
of digital censorship and surveillance to limit the liberating effects of digital technologies
in an attempt to remain in power. 50 Whereas censorship violates the right to freedom of
expression, surveillance violates the right to privacy. 51 There are two main mechanisms of
Internet censorship used by states to limit the flow of information: manipulation and
demobilization.52 In less developed states with lower levels of technology integration and
adoption, demobilization is the main mechanism of Internet censorship. Increasingly, nondemocratic regimes in which levels of technology integration and adoption are lower,
Internet shutdowns have become the most prominent type of demobilization tactic. 53
Within the context of digital technologies, surveillance can be defined as “a policing tactic

48. Rod and Weidmann, “Empowering activists or autocrats?” 340.
49. Diamond, “Liberation Technology,” 5.
50. Chang and Lin, “Autocracy log in,” 876.
51. Chang and Lin, “Autocracy log in,” 874.
52. Chang and Lin, “Autocracy log in,” 876.
53. Marie Lamensch, “Authoritarianism Has Been Reinvented for the Digital Age,” CIGI, last
updated July 9, 2021. https://www.cigionline.org/articles/authoritarianism-has-been-reinventedfor-the-digital-age/
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with aims to quell or weaken political activity in order to gather information about social
movements and inhibit them from accomplishing their plans.” 54 Both censorship and
surveillance attempt to obstruct citizens’ ability to use digital technology for the promotion
of democratic practices that could result in the regime’s loss of power. Moreover, Rod and
Weidmann suggest that for the regime, “simply signaling presence on the Web may be
equally effective in deterring consumption of certain information” through contributing to
an environment of fear and self-censorship.55
Morozov suggests that regimes seek to control the digital spread of information
through a combination of technological and sociopolitical means.56 Censorship and
surveillance are considered technological mechanisms, while sociopolitical refers to the
use of legislation, physical imprisonment, fees, and so on.57 While there are inevitably
solutions to technological mechanisms such as circumvention tools like VPNs and
encryption, Morozov contends that “the great paradox is that the rising profile of ‘liberation
technology’ may push Internet-control effect into nontechnological areas for which there
is no easy technical ‘fix.’”58 In countries where censorship and surveillance are not able to
have a sustained impact on the flow of information, regimes have begun to utilize
sociopolitical mechanisms more frequently—especially when technological mechanisms
54. Evronia Azer, Yingqin Zheng and G. Harindranath, "Paradoxes of Visibility: The
Inter-Play of Online Power Dynamics between Activists and the State in the Egyptian
Revolution," Mediterranean Conference on Information Systems 2018 Proceedings,
(2018): 2.
55. Rod and Weidmann, “Empowering activists or autocrats?” 341.
56. Evgeny Morozov, “Whither Internet Control?” in Liberation Technology: Social
Media and the Struggle for Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner
(Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press and the National Endowment for
Democracy, 2012), 58.
57. Morozov, “Whither Internet Control?” 58.
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have failed to restrict mass mobilization (Egypt) or the growth of political opposition
(Tanzania).
Through his explorations at the intersection of democracy and technology, Barber
seems to possess more optimism about the future of democracy in the face of digital
technology. However, he is very clear that the only way forward is through a joint effort
on the part of citizens and the government to consciously shape technology to fit current
needs-- to find places where technology can plug specific holes in governance. 59 Even in
the face of technological and sociopolitical obstacles to the potential for digital
technologies to promote democratic practices under non-democratic regimes, there are
strategic opportunities where the affordances of digital technologies can remain liberatory.

59. Barber, “Three Scenarios for the Future of Technology and Strong Democracy,” 582.
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CHAPTER 2: EGYPT
Commentaries on the impact of technology on political movements typically fall
into two categorizations: technology will liberate, or technology will repress. In his
revolutionary book Liberation Technology, Larry Diamond argues that it is neither. Rather,
the same technology can have a myriad of impacts within the same political movement
depending on its application. Under this notion, we must ask, what can be done to mitigate
the repressive impacts of technologies that simultaneously provide avenues for liberation
under non-democratic regimes? Diamond further argues that although most uses of digital
technologies are inherently apolitical, they can serve as a tool for empowerment, lowering
barriers to entry into the political sphere. 60 In countries where political contestation has
been stifled, Diamond suggests that digital technologies have been able to “[emerge] as an
alternative political scene where a discourse on democracy and human rights [is] still
possible.”61 Egypt provides an ideal case to explore the complex impacts that digital
technologies can have on political contestation under non-democratic regimes.
During the 2011 Arab Spring revolution throughout the Middle East and North
Africa, information communication technologies (ICTs) served as a vehicle through which
people frustrated with the political situation could unite, offering them a civic space in
which to begin an effort to gain democratic freedoms and contest repressive regimes.

60. Larry Diamond, “Liberation Technology,” in Liberation Technology: Social Media
and the Struggle for Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Maryland:
The Johns Hopkins University Press and the National Endowment for Democracy, 2012),
5.
61. Patrick Meier, “Ushahidi as a Liberation Technology,” in Liberation Technology:
Social Media and the Struggle for Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner
(Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press and the National Endowment for
Democracy, 2012), 100.
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Simultaneously, autocrats within these countries were able to use the same technologies to
launch a counter-revolution, stifling dissent and cracking down on any form of political
contestation. As will become increasingly evident through this exploration of Egypt as a
case study, Diamond’s contention that technology is neither liberatory nor repressive holds
true.

Contextual Background
In his 1996 “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” John Perry Barlow
states that “We are creating a world where anyone, anywhere, may express his or her
beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being coerced into silence or conformity.” 62
Early scholars of the Internet, like Barlow, viewed its decentralized structure as inherently
beneficial to democratic advancement in that through freedom in the flow of information,
more citizens would be afforded the ability to participate in and engage with governance. 63
Moreover, Barlow and his contemporaries believed that the Internet would allow for not
just participation itself but also the freedom to express one’s true beliefs due to the ability
to remain anonymous online. Leading up to the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions, this was
very much the predominant mode of thinking across the globe at the intersection of political
action and digital technologies.

62. John Perry Barlow, “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” (February 8,
1996)https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence
63. Elizabeth Stoycheff, G. Scott Burgess, and Maria Clara Martucci, "Online Censorship
and Digital Surveillance: The Relationship between Suppression Technologies and
Democratization Across Countries," Information, Communication & Society vol. 17:1
(2018), 2.
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During the early days of the Internet, Egypt’s then-president, Hosni Mubarak, saw
the economic benefits of Internet and mobile phone adoption, making the creation of a
telecommunications industry and support an information-literate population national
priorities. At the end of 2000, there were only 450,000 Internet users in Egypt, but by 2011
that number had increased to 29 million.64 As a result, Internet use in Egypt spread much
more quickly than in other nations in the region. 65 By 2005, Egyptians had widely adopted
blogging and social media-based Internet sites. In 2008, more than 15% of blogs in Egypt
had between 10,000 and 50,000 visitors, with 8.4% of blogs attracting more than 50,000
visitors.66 Prior to the 2011 revolution, mobile phone usage in Egypt was almost ubiquitous
(about 80% penetration),67 and the country’s population used the Internet more than any
other country in the Arab world.68
Spurred by the evolving political dynamics, these uses for the Internet gained
traction quickly as they provided an avenue for citizens to share grievances. 69 Prior to the
Arab Spring, Egyptian activists turned to the Internet as a platform from which to spread
ideas about the freedoms and democratic practices lacking in political life to engage

64. Paradigm Initiative, “LONDA: Egypt Digital Rights and Inclusion 2020 Report,” A
Paradigm Initiative Publication (April 2021), 2.
65. Vasileios Karagiannopoulos, “The Role of the Internet in Political Struggles: Some
Conclusions from Iran and Egypt,” New Political Science, vol. 34:1 (2012), 158.
66. Noha Fathy, “Freedom of expression in the digital age: enhanced or undermined? The
case of Egypt,” Journal of Cyber Policy vol. 3:1 (2018), 106.
67. Anne Alexander, “Internet role in Egypt’s protests,” BBC, last updated February 9,
2011. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12400319
68. Muzammil M. Hussain and Philip N. Howard, “Information Technology and the
Limited States of the Arab Spring,” in Bits and Atoms: Information and Communication
Technology in Areas of Limited Statehood, ed. Steven Livingston and Gregor WalterDrop (London: Oxford University Press, 2014): 21.
69. Karagiannopoulos,“The Role of the Internet in Political Struggles,” 158.
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citizens throughout the country. 70 By 2008, Mubarak’s regime had already begun to see
the ways in which the Internet could offer the population a potent voice; thus, they quickly
began efforts to crack down on anti-regime discourse that was beginning to proliferate
online.71
In June of 2010, a young Egyptian citizen named Khaled Saeed was beaten to death
by Egyptian security forces, and images of Saeed’s disfigured face circulated widely online
as evidence of unrestrained police brutality and corruption, provoking unrest throughout
the country. 72 It is thought that Saeed’s arrest and subsequent death were in retaliation for
a video Saeed has posted on YouTube of police officers pocketing money from a drug
operation, highlighting rampant government corruption.73 The widely circulated graphic
images of Khaled Saeed had a monumental impact on the psyche of Egyptian society and
directly ignited an outrage within the population to push back against the actions of the
state’s security forces and mobilize in protest. The image has been considered “the face
that launched a revolution” by many media outlets since the events of the protest
themselves.74 This event and the resulting outrage festered throughout the population and

70. Geelmuyden Rød Espen and Nils B. Weidmann, "Empowering Activists Or
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was worsened by rigged election outcomes in December. Throughout the end of 2010,
protest movements and clashes with Mubarak’s security forces had continued to rise. 75
The 2011 Egyptian Revolution began on January 25, Egypt’s national “Police
Day,” in which the country honors the police. When combined with rising tensions around
police brutality and the success of Tunisia’s revolution that had occurred eleven days prior,
widespread political mobilization perpetuated through the use of digital technologies
erupted throughout the country. 76 By exposing the corruption within Mubarak’s regime
publicly and in a largely accessible space, activists were able to use the Internet to involve
greater portions of the population in this call to action than previously possible. ICTs were
a crucial tool used by activists to stoke the flames of civic unrest and enabled citizens to
identify and share the regime’s missteps. Mona El-Ghobashy suggests that his confluence
of factors – technology, Tunisia, and internal tensions – created the conditions for the 2011
revolution in Egypt.77
There is some disagreement among scholars regarding how much causality can be
assigned to digital technologies themselves. However, there is unanimous agreement that
digital technologies did contribute to the massive citizen participation in the protests. By
the afternoon of the first day of protest on 25 January 2011, 90,000 people had come
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together in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. It is estimated that in total over 10 million protesters
participated in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. 78

Figure 2.1: Protesters gather in Egypt’s Tahrir Square on February 8, 2011.79

After the 2011 revolution, online activism in Egypt continued to flourish and served
as the main vehicle through which human rights violations were documented and shared
with the population.80 Morsireen (Insistent) was a central platform utilized by Egyptian
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digital activists in the wake of 2011 to document protests as well as ongoing police and
military brutality throughout the country. 81
Under the framework proposed by Diamond, during the Arab Spring in Egypt, the
Internet served as a “liberation technology.” Diamond uses the term liberation technology
in reference to any technology that has “demonstrated potential to empower citizens to
confront, contain, and hold accountable authoritarian regimes – and even to liberate
societies from autocracy.”82 At the outset, it appears as though the Internet did function as
this utopian vision of technology’s potential; however, due to the Internet’s ability to
enable citizens to hold leaders accountable, many autocrats viewed and continue to view
the Internet as a threat to their regime’s stability.
As the Internet’s ability to increase the flow of information throughout the
population, Mubarak’s regime responded to protest mobilization by restricting such flows
of information. This type of reactive measure confirms the theory that the opportunities
afforded to advocacy groups and civil society by the Internet are countered by reactive
measures on the part of the regime as put forward by Chun-Chin Chang and Thung-Hong.83
In a direct response to the Internet’s use in the mobilization of protesters,
Mubarak’s regime took draconian measures to stop the flow of information among the
population by instituting a blackout Internet shutdown, the most comprehensive form of
Internet shutdown. The government further responded with censorship and surveillance
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technologies. As suggested by Unver, many of the tools that are “essential for protest and
dissent planning and coordination, deliberately or passively worked with governments and
intelligence agencies to help spy on these movements.”84
While Mubarak stepped down on February 11, 2011, eighteen days after the start
of the protests, the momentum of the revolution was unable to manifest into actionable
change.85 Egypt’s first democratically elected President, Mohamed Morsi, was overthrown
in a 2013 military coup. After coming into power, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi explicitly
sought to expand the use of online censorship mechanisms to control the population’s
access to information and communications tools in the hopes of preventing further political
instability.86

Liberation Technologies
While it seems as though Egypt provides a window into the Internet’s lost promise,
there are many opportunities to learn from Egypt’s successes and failures. As the early
utopian hopes for the Internet fade, the potential to think more critically about the
interaction between online and offline spaces has begun to emerge. In her work on ICTs
and protest in non-democracies, Ashley Anderson notes that the success of protests
stemming from these online spaces is not entirely reliant on the structure of the online space
itself. Rather, the success of the protest relies heavily on the embedded system of collective
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action already ingrained within the community at large.87 Whereas activist communities
prior to the advent of the Internet struggled to engage large enough portions of the
population to make a substantial difference, online activist communities absent the offline
support structure failed to withstand the inevitable government retaliation. If activist
communities can work to merge the strengths of online protest mobilization with the
strengths of engrained community structure, society’s problem of collective action could
be one step closer to being solved.
Anderson’s research finds that while participation is impacted by ICTs, such as
social media, the most important factor for protest success is membership in physical
organizational networks. In Egypt, and throughout the Arab world, in 2011, protest was
not because of the Internet, but rather, the Internet facilitated the means through which
collective action occurred. Following the death of Khalid Said, Egyptian technologist and
activist Wael Ghonim created a Facebook page called “We Are All Khaled Said,” which
became a virtual gathering place for anti-Mubarak citizens leading up to as well as during
the revolution.88 Between 2010 and 2011, Facebook users in Egypt climbed from 4.2
million users to 9.4 million. 89 As part of the coordination for the 25 January protests,
compilation videos of Egyptian police brutality were circulated on YouTube and shared on
“We Are All Khaled Said” as a form of get out the protest advertisements to re-ignite
outrage via audio-visual means.90 The impact of peer-to-peer communication coupled with
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visual representations of brutality significantly increased the potency of the information
being circulated online; thus, serving to mobilize greater portions of the population than
ever before. The free flow of information afforded by digital ICTs had a direct effect in
that it enabled citizens to expose police brutality and government corruption on a mass
scale.91

Figure 2.2: Protester’s sign captures the impact of technology (February 2011).92
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Through public posts on social media platforms, activists were able to issue a call
to action and mobilize the population with the touch of a button. 93 On the morning of the
protest, activists shared the location and time of the protest using mobile phones and online.
By posting the time and location on platforms like Facebook, the pool of potential
protesters was greatly increased as barriers to participation were lowered. Researchers have
found that 28.3% of protesters in Tahrir Square during the revolution found out about the
protests on Facebook. 94 For all protesters – including those who heard about the protest
through other means – 52% were found to have a Facebook account, and almost 100% of
those people had used the social media platform to share information or document the
protests.95
While digital technologies played a crucial role leading up to the revolution in terms
of providing an avenue for the organization of collective action, digital technologies also
played a crucial role during the protests themselves. Live-tweeting was a critical tool
utilized by Egyptian activists to communicate with protestors efficiently and effectively
throughout the country and provided citizens with the ability to document and share content
from protests in real-time.96 Moreover, protesters projected Facebook into Tahrir Square
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at night in order to get and share information about the revolution as there was a fear that
Mubarak would use the traditional channels of mass communication for his own ends. 97

Figure 2.3: Protesters in Tahrir Square watch s projection of Facebook.98

Countering Liberation Technologies
In order to understand the potential that digital ICTs hold for the pursuit of
democratic practices under non-democratic regimes, it is crucial to explore the
complicating tensions between digital technology’s liberation potential and its repressive
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affordances. In his writing on the process of democratization, Charles Tilly contends that
“democratization has rarely occurred, and still occurs rarely, because under most political
regimes in most social environments major political actors have strong incentives and
means to block the very processes that promote democratization.” 99
In the case of Egypt, once Mubarak’s regime began to see the potential political
impacts of the Internet through the widespread use of blogging throughout the population
leading up to the 2011 revolution, it made an explicit effort to nationalize key components
of the telecommunications industry and create close relationships with private
telecommunications companies (Telcos) and Internet service providers (ISPs). To
promulgate control over ISPs, the government took control of the dissemination of
necessary permits, denying permits to ISPs that did not agree to the regime’s standards for
government intervention. By monopolizing Telcos and ISPs, either through state
ownership or close relationships, the government was able to serve as the hand on the lever
controlling the population’s access to information during the 2011 revolution by enacting
a blackout Internet shutdown. This relationship is what enabled the 2011 shutdown enacted
by Mubarak’s regime amidst the revolution itself.
On 27 January 2011, Mubarak’s regime had enacted a blackout Internet shutdown
to restrict the free flow of information throughout the country that was enabling the mass
organization of activists and citizens in protest on the streets.100 One of the first actions
taken by the regime was to shut down mobile phone networks throughout the country, as
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mobile phones were a central tool used by activists to share protest locations and other
important information.101 On Friday, January 28, 2011, Mubarak’s regime began asking
large ISPs within the country to shut down service. The blackout shutdown lasted for five
days and affected 93% of networks across the country.102 However, this blackout shutdown
did not have entirely beneficial impacts for the government. By cutting off access to
information to the entire country, Mubarak’s regime hurt its own functionality as well. 103
Mubarak’s regime made the decision that shutting down the Internet to stifle the flow of
information throughout the population was more crucial to regime stability than the
negative socio-economic impacts that a blackout Internet shutdown would have on the
population. The state’s previous effort to exert control over the country’s Internet
infrastructure and fiber-optic cables enabled the regime to easily execute a blackout
Internet shutdown, enact episodes of Internet throttling, and cut off the country’s domestic
text messaging networks during the 2011 revolution to inhibit the ability of activists and
civil society groups to utilize the Internet to organize protests, share information, and
coordinate the revolution.104,105
In addition to controlling the flow of information through censorship and
restrictions, the government also attempted to use digital surveillance to combat the
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revolution. To combat the affordance that social media platforms were providing to antiMubarak protesters, Mubarak’s security apparatus turned to Facebook and Twitter, tools
that activists had been using to coordinate protests and share information, as a means of
tracking key activists. 106 Namely, in the hopes of stopping “We Are All Khaled Said,”
security forces utilized Facebook to identify and subsequently imprison Wael Ghonim on
January 27, 2011.107 Moreover, as the protests began to break out, the state used Facebook
pages to identify and locate 40 leaders who had participated in large-scale anti-regime
protests in 2008, hoping to clamp down on protest leadership and quell the revolution
before it began in earnest.108 While these platforms helped to facilitate the mass scale of
the revolution, they were not only vulnerable to shutdowns but also to surveillance by the
regime.
Mubarak’s regime attempted to further hamper the flows of information that
contributed to the opposition by coopting Vodafone and utilizing subscriber information to
issue pro-regime text messages during the protests themselves. 109 In this case, it is clear to
see the ways in which a single digital technology, such as mobile phones, can be used at
once to enable activists to live-tweet the events of the revolution itself, while at the exact
same time be utilized by the regime for their own ends to push back against the opposition.

106. Hussain and Howard, “Information Technology and the Limited States of the Arab
Spring,” 22.
107. Alaimo, “How the Facebook Arabic Page ‘We Are All Khaled Said’ Helped
Promote the Egyptian Revolution,” 4.
108. Papic and Noonan, “Social Media as a Tool for Protest.”
109. Marc Lynch, "After Egypt: The Limits and Promise of Online Challenges to the
Authoritarian Arab State," Perspectives on Politics, vol. 9:2 (2011), 301-310.

38

In his exploration of Egypt’s democratic transition following the 2011 revolution,
Marc Lynch highlights the impact of social media-driven movements on the postrevolution environment. Lynch argues that social media changes the shape of the
information ecosystem and greatly influences the flow of political information such that
inter-group differences and fears are often heightened.110 In the case of Egypt, for example,
it is believed that the revolution’s reliance on social media deepened the divide between
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the Muslim Brotherhood. 111
In the years since the 2011 revolution, Internet freedom in Egypt has been steadily
declining.112 Sisi’s regime also relies on emerging surveillance technologies to combat
potential opposition. Upon coming to power, Sisi’s regime began using deep packet
inspection (DPI) software, a tool that is arguably one of the most extreme forms of Internet
surveillance and censorship available to governments, enabling regimes to censor content
in real-time while collecting metadata on citizen’s actions online. 113 DPI goes beyond
content restrictions, extending the arm of the government by putatively monitoring text
conversations on chat-based platforms such as Skype, WhatsApp, and Viber. 114
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Since coming to power, Sisi has blocked upwards of 500 websites, many of which
include local and independent news outlets, influential blogs, political movement sites, and
local and international human rights organizations.115 In further efforts to control
information, the state has blocked the use of circumvention tools such as VPNs that enable
citizens to bypass state censorship and potential shutdowns. 116

“Freedom on the Net”: 2009 - 2019

Figure 2.4: Egypt’s Freedom House’s “Freedom on the Net” score declines
steadily (graph from Institute of Development Studies, 2021). 117

115. Shahbaz, “Freedom on the Net 2018.”
116 Shahbaz, “Freedom on the Net 2018.”
117. Mohamed Farahat, “Egypt Digital Rights Landscape Report,” Institute of
Development Studies (2021): 219.

40

The use of such tools has led to a more problematic form of censorship in Egypt:
self-censorship. Invisible forms of surveillance lead to the practice of self-censorship in a
population as citizens are unsure of how and when they are being watched by the
government. As a result, the fear of arrest or violence by the state in response to actions
online has caused the Egyptian populace to watch their words very carefully. Not only is
the government dictating what people see online through censorship of information, but
the government is also controlling how and when people interact in online environments. 118
Over the last decade, Sisi has deepened the use of such technologies by signing a
series of new laws that legitimizes his regime’s ability to utilize such repressive tools. The
2018 passage of the Cybercrime Law (175/2018) and the Press and Media Regulation Law
(180/2018) provide Sisi’s regime with significant legal justification for a variety of digital
rights violations that serve to suppress the flow of anti-government information. By
invoking national security, the Cybercrime Law empowers the government to enact digital
censorship and surveillance on its own population. In the law itself, the language used to
define matters of national security is aptly vague, allowing for “a pattern of repression
justified by labeling dissent or criticism as threatening to state stability.” 119 Whereas the
Cybercrime Law targets government access to user data and criminalizes certain types of
content more broadly, the Press and Media Regulation Law “Treat[s] social media accounts
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and blogs with more than 5,000 followers as media outlets, which would make them
vulnerable to prosecution,” as the law also includes sweeping provisions for the blocking
of media and journalistic content. 120,121

Conclusion
The proliferation of digital technologies within Egypt, beginning in 1993
with the introduction of the Internet, manifests as a double-edged sword, providing new
avenues to express discontent with the regime while additionally providing the regime with
new abilities to crack down on dissent. While the Egyptian Revolution and the Arab Spring
more broadly are largely synonymous with the democratizing potential of digital
technologies, they also serve as a powerful reminder that citizen power alone cannot
counter a regime’s technological and sociopolitical capabilities.
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CHAPTER 3: TANZANIA
Over the past two decades, the rate of technological growth in Sub-Saharan Africa
has led many techno-optimists to hope that the fate of digital technologies as tools for
autocrats is not definite. In the mid-2000s, grass-roots innovations, like the first of its kind
mobile payment system M-Pesa, captivated the world. To many, these local solutions
suggested that “The right combination of social networking tools and an active audience
allows any individual to inspire and coordinate collective action outside of a formal
hierarchy.”122

Many statistics point toward Tanzania being on the rise as it was re-categorized
from a low-income country to a lower-middle-income country by the World Bank in July
2020.123 However, there are many crucial ways in which the country has simultaneously
been in decline over the past ten years. As noted by the World Bank in their
contextualization of Tanzania’s new July 2020 status: “The strongest decline has been in
the rule of law, governance effectiveness, and voice and accountability whereby political,
media and civil society organization’s freedoms have continued to shrink.” 124 The 2010,
2015, and 2020 general elections in Tanzania serve as a clear line through which to draw
the declining trajectory of crucial freedoms by the state’s ruling party. However, it is also

122. Maja Bott, Björn-Sören Gigler, and Gregor Young, “The Role of Crowdsourcing for
Better Governance in Fragile State Contexts,” in Closing the Feedback Loop: Can
Technology Bridge the Accountability Gap?, ed. Björn-Sören Gigler and Savita Bailur
(Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2014), 109.
123. “The World Bank in Tanzania,” The World Bank,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tanzania/overview#1
124. “The World Bank in Tanzania,” The World Bank

43

during those elections that the rise of liberation technologies to empower citizens to reclaim
the integrity of the democratic practice accountable elections gained significant traction.

Contextual Background
The Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) is the longest-serving political party on the
African continent, having been in power since the country gained independence from
Britain in 1961.125 Between 1961 and 1992, the CCM ruled a one-party state. The
introduction of multi-party elections in 1992 did not pose any serious threat to the CCM’s
power until the 2010 general election. In 2005, the CCM candidate, Jakaya Kikwete, won
by 80% over the “opposition” candidate.126 The case of Tanzania differs from other cases
in which digital technology has been turned on its heels and used to repress rather than
liberate in that rather than one sole dictator attempting to hold onto power; it is one party
with different candidates over the years desperately trying to hold onto power. From the
outside, Tanzania seems less authoritarian than countries like Uganda, where one leader
has been in power for many decades, but the same techniques are employed in both cases.
As the party managed to remain in power through the transition from a one-party to a multiparty system, one can assume that the CCM’s objective is to use every tool at their disposal
to remain in power through the introduction of digital technologies into the political sphere.

125. Marielle Harris, “A No-Confidence Vote in Tanzania’s Upcoming Elections,”
Center for Strategic & International Studies, October 26, 2020
https://www.csis.org/analysis/no-confidence-vote-tanzanias-upcoming-elections
126. Jeffery Gettleman, “Incumbent Wins Spirited Election in Tanzania,” The New York
Times, November 5, 2010
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/06/world/africa/06tanzania.html
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That said, during the 2010 election, the CCM’s margin of victory decreased from
80% to 62% within the span of Kikwete’s five-year term.127 This was a dramatic departure
from the previous elections. Many scholars suggest that the increase in mobile phone
adoption and Internet penetration between 2005 and 2010 contributed greatly to the
opposition’s ability to gain popularity throughout the country.
There is one specific digital technology that greatly contributed to the CCM’s
decline between 2005 and 2010: Ushahidi’s crowdmapping platform. Activists in Kenya
initially created Ushahidi, a free and open-source software, to digitally map crowdsourced
incidents of post-election violence in real-time following Kenya’s 2008 general election. 128
Seeing the platform’s massive success, civil society organizations in Kenya, Uganda, and
Tanzania partnered with Ushahidi to create a similar platform specifically intended to
crowdsource election accountability. Uchaguzi (the Swahili word for “election”) is an
offshoot of Ushahidi (the Swahili word for “witness” or “testimony”). Like Ushahidi,
where citizens were able to use web-enabled devices or mobile phones to document and
report instances of human rights abuses through a digital platform that maps claims in realtime for citizens, Uchaguzi uses similar mechanisms to allow citizens to report instances
of electoral violations directly to the platform to promote greater transparency,
accountability, and integrity of elections.129 The platform continues to be updated and used
to promote citizen engagement with electoral accountability throughout Sub-Saharan

127. Gettleman, “Incumbent Wins Spirited Election in Tanzania.”
128. Deobatus Patrick Shayo, “Doing old things in a new way? Technology and
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(2021), 2.
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Africa and elsewhere across the globe. Ushahidi, Inc. is now a non-profit technology
company with multiple different platforms that were created after the success of the first
Ushahidi map in Kenya. 130 Uchaguzi was created using Ushahidi’s Crowdmap platform
that had launched in 2010.131

Figure 3.1: Uchaguzi platform snapshot from the 2017 Kenyan election.132,133

130. Patrick Meier, “Ushahidi as a Liberation Technology,” in Liberation Technology:
Social Media and the Struggle for Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner
(Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press and the National Endowment for
Democracy, 2012), 95.
131. Meier, “Ushahidi as a Liberation Technology,” 97.
132. “Elections are important to Ushahidi,” Ushahidi,
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133. In 2010, Ushahidi created a specific election and violence mapping tool
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During Tanzania’s 2010 general election, Uchaguzi was employed to supplement
official election observation. Citizen reports mapped on Uchaguzi during the election
included examples such as: “campaign intimidation of female candidates”; “voters’ names
missing from voter register”; “purchasing of voter cards”; and “media biased in reporting
election campaigns.”134 After initial tallies were recorded, the opposition candidate, the
Chadema party’s Willibrod Peter Slaa, demanded a recount in response to the digital
documentation of cases of electoral violations by the ruling party. The recount ultimately
took five days to complete, during which citizen fears regarding the integrity of the results
began to increase as many believed the delay was caused by efforts to rig the results in
favor of the CCM’s incumbent President Jakaya Kikwete. 135 Ultimately, it was announced
that President Jakaya Kikwete and the CCM had won the election. 136
Scholar Catie Snow Bailard refers to the use of Uchaguzi during the 2010 election
as “a service that allowed citizens to reflect on the performance of their election
administration system” in that the platform served as a proverbial lens through which
citizens could more accurately see how the government was performing in a way
previously unavailable.137 Bailard conducted a field study during the 2010 election, from

this one re crowdmap being down since the beginning of 2021 and if the people didb;t
request it be moved over then it was just archieved.
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62 (2012): 336.
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136. Bailard, “A Field Experiment on the Internet’s Effect in an African Election:
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which she concluded that “Internet use diminished individuals’ perception of the fairness
and impartiality of both the election and the subsequent recount.” 138 As the Internet and
Internet-enabled digital technologies directly contributed to a lack of confidence in the
legitimacy of the ruling party, the case of Egypt would suggest that the ruling party would
respond by restricting the ability of citizens to access and share information leading up to,
during, and after elections in an effort to remain in power.
The CCM’s response to this strengthening of the opposition can clearly be seen
leading up to the 2015 general election and even more so leading up to and during the 2020
general election. Between 2010 and 2015, President Kikwete pursued a series of legislative
efforts that sought to control the ability of information to spread within online
environments that might pose a threat to the regime’s position of power.139 As the 2015
election drew nearer, the policing of online communication continued to increase, and users
found to be in violation were faced with potential imprisonment or fines. 140 Regardless,
Uchaguzi was implemented again before, during, and after the election to monitor for
potential cases of election misconduct. During the campaigning period, the CCM’s
opposition candidate, Edward Lowassa, proved extremely popular among the population.
For many observers, both international and domestic, it seemed possible that this election

138. Bailard, “A Field Experiment on the Internet’s Effect in an African Election:
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could serve as a turning point for Tanzania. 141 Ultimately, it was a turning point, but not in
the direction observers had hoped.
The CCM’s candidate, John Magufuli, won the 2015 election with 58% of the vote,
down from the CCM’s 62% in 2010. The opposition candidate, Lowassa, won 40% of the
vote, up from the main opposition candidate’s 27% in 2010.142 Regardless of the legislative
efforts, Kikwete enacted between 2010 and 2015, the CCM’s margin of victory continued
to shrink. As this election was even closer than before and the threat of a successful
opposition candidate continued to rise, it became clear that Magufuli would need to
continue to place restrictions on the spread of information to remain in power following
the 2020 election.143

141. Dan Paget, “Tanzania: Shrinking Space and Opposition Protest,” Journal of
Democracy vol. 28:3 (2017): 153.
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Tanzania General Election: % of Vote and Margin of Victory: 2000 - 2015

Figure 3.2: Decrease in CCM’s % of vote and margin of victory over time (Source: National Electoral
Commission of the United Republic of Tanzania).144

As previous efforts to tighten the information space had failed to suppress the
opposition, the period leading up to the 2020 election was marked by a drastic shift to more
authoritarian leadership. Between 2015 and the 2020 general election, Magufuli enacted a
series of increasingly restrictive and repressive laws limiting the ability of the media,
journalists, civil society, and everyday citizens to share information. In addition to
legislative and structural efforts to stifle the opposition, Magufuli also utilized other forms
of repression such as Internet shutdowns to ensure that his efforts did not fail to maintain

144. Paget, “Tanzania: Shrinking Space and Opposition Protest,” 159
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his position of power. As a direct result of his drastic measures, Magufuli won the 2020
election by 84% of the vote, the CCM’s largest margin of victory since 2005.145

Digital Democracy
In discussing how society can combat the global rise of authoritarianism, Larry
Diamond claimed that “we also need a renewed effort, using a variety of technologies new
and old, to promote the ideas and values of democracy.”146 Through the potential to
provide more opportunities for participatory governance, liberation technologies alter the
relationship between citizens and their governments, enabling people to hold leaders
accountable.147 In cases like Tanzania, where the same party has ruled since 1961,
liberation technologies utilize new ideas and provide opportunities for the promotion of
democratic practices such as electoral transparency, accountability, and integrity.
Digital crowdsourcing enables activists and citizens to circumvent electoral corruption
and fraud in new and important ways, providing opportunities for “citizens to report news,
expose wrongdoings, express opinions, mobilize protest, monitor elections, scrutinize

145. Sina Schlimmer and Cyrielle Maingraud-Martinaud, “Tanzania’s 2020 General
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government, deepen participation, and expand the horizons of freedom.” 148 To
crowdsource simply means to draw on the larger population – the crowd – for services,
ideas, and/or content.149 Scholars identify three main categories of crowdsourcing:
•

Bounded crowdsourcing: a limited number of trained or “trusted” citizens serve as
the crowd.150

•

Unbounded crowdsourcing: anyone can contribute and be part of the crowd.151

•

Passive crowdsourcing: indirect engagement of citizens serves as the crowd.152

In the case of electoral monitoring through digital crowdsourcing, each type of
crowdsourcing can be and often is utilized. During the 2010 and 2015 general elections in
Tanzania, bounded, unbounded, and passive crowdsourcing methods were incorporated
into the Uchaguzi mapping. 153 Through the live geo-mapping of crowdsourced reports,
citizens in Tanzania directly participated in the election monitoring process.

148. Deobatus Patrick Shayo, “Crowdsourcing and Digitization of Electoral Integrity: A
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Figure 3.3: Multiple methods of crowdsourcing election observation utilized.154

Ushahidi’s customized election monitoring platform Uchaguzi was initially
developed in collaboration with the Constitution & Reform Education Consortium
(CRECO) in Kenya to monitor the 2010 Kenyan referendum. 155 Also, in 2010, Uchaguzi
was implemented during the general election in Tanzania to supplement traditional election
observation institutions through mapping crowdsourced reports of election irregularities.
The dramatic narrowing of the CCM’s margin of victory during the 2010 election is a
byproduct of Uchaguzi’s capacity to provide greater transparency into the electoral process
by opening avenues for greater civil society and citizen engagement. Since then, Ushahidi
has developed their strategy to extend beyond reactionary measures, “to proactively

154. Shayo, “Citizen Participation in Local Democracy Online.” 855.
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[engage] with ordinary citizens and stakeholders to help foster transparency and
accountability in elections across the globe.” 156
While the 2010 election showed great promise, the 2015 general election proved to
be even more instrumental in illustrating the affordances of ICTs and digital crowdsourcing
for election monitoring and the impact that greater transparency can have on electoral
outcomes. During the 2015 general election in Tanzania, the Tanzania Civil Society
Consortium on Election Observation (TACCEO), under its Tanzania Election Observation
Centre (TEOC), introduced two distinct Uchaguzi platforms: one for bounded
crowdsourcing and another for unbounded crowdsourcing of election observation. 157
Uchaguzi Wetu 2015 was utilized as a platform for bounded crowdsourcing methods
wherein data was collected by observers who were specifically trained for the purposes of
data collection.158 This platform was limited to those trained and “trusted” individuals as a
means of collecting information about the election. Uchaguzi Wetu 2015 was a joint project
between TACCEO and Tanzania’s main domestic election monitoring organization,
Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO).159 However, this platform was not
nearly as useful or accessible as TACCEO’s other digital crowdsourcing platform during
the 2015 election that also utilized the Ushahidi platform: Uchaguzi Tanzania 2015.
Through the Uchaguzi Tanzania 2015 platform, anyone could submit eyewitness

156. “Elections are important to Ushahidi,” Ushahidi.
157. Shayo, “Crowdsourcing and Digitization of Electoral Integrity,” 130.
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observation reports throughout the election, utilizing the unbounded model of
crowdsourcing.160 In order to submit reports, citizens were able to use a wide variety of
methods to funnel information into the Uchaguzi platform. Reports could be sent by: 161
•

SMS via 0758606162 or 0653775995

•

iPhone or Android application

•

Email via uchaguziinfo@gmail.com

•

Fill out web form on the Uchaguzi platform

•

Twitter: @ChaguziTanzania or #TaarifazauchaguziTanzania

•

Facebook page: “Taarifa Za Uchaguzi Tanzania”

Reporting incidents were then verified by a team of trained individuals and disseminated
through the Ushahidi platform accessed via www.uchaguzitanzania.or.tz. In total, of the
6,598 reports received, 4,598 verified reported were mapped on the Uchaguzi platform
during the 2015 general election.162 Although the Uchaguzi geo-map is no longer available
at that link as a result of platform reconstruction that began in early 2021, the verified
crowdsourced reports mapped during the 2015 general election were visible online as such:

160. Shayo, “Crowdsourcing and Digitization of Electoral Integrity,” 132.
161. Shayo, “Crowdsourcing and Digitization of Electoral Integrity,” 132.
162. LHRC and TACCEO, “Report on the United Republic of Tanzania General
Elections of 2015,” (March 2016): 18.
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Figure 3.4: Ushahidi software mapping election funneled into aggregate website found at
www.uchaguzitanzania.or.tz163

Additionally, in collaboration with the Legal and Human Rights Center (LHRC),
TACCEO created a variety of other online spaces for citizens to join in a digital community
during the election. The website www.uchaguzi.info.tz served as a centralized location for
the different digital tools created for the observation and monitoring of the election. By
aggregating tools for the crowdsourcing of reports in combination with tools for receiving

163. Shayo, “Crowdsourcing and Digitization of Electoral Integrity,” 133. (Accessed by
Shayo Jan 4, 2016).
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independent information about the election outside of traditional and state-controlled
media, TACCEO created a more transparent electoral environment.

Figure 3.5: TACCEO’s aggregate Uchaguzi Tanzania 2015 platform. 164

Through the aggregate platform, both bounded and unbounded crowdsourcing methods
were utilized to share information about the election. LHRC and TACCEO mapped the
flow of information into the www.uchaguzi.info.tz platform:

164. Shayo, “Crowdsourcing and Digitization of Electoral Integrity,” 133. (Accessed by
Shayo Jan 4, 2016).
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Figure 3.6: Flow of information into www.uchaguzi.info.tz platform during 2015 general election. 165

Ultimately, the platform was hugely successful in providing both the domestic as
well as the international community with more transparent information about the election.
It was reported that a minimum of 3.6 million users both in Tanzania and also in a variety
of other countries across the globe interacted with the content supported by the
www.uchaguzi.info.tz platform during the 2015 general election. 166 Data collected by
TACCEO on the traffic of the Ushahidi map specifically illustrates that there was a fair
amount of users present on the website in the lead up to the election, reaching a peak on
the day of the election itself to share and receive information about incidents of electoral

165. LHRC and TACCEO, “Report on the United Republic of Tanzania General
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irregularities.167 LHRC and TACCEO mapped the platform traffic before, during, and after
the October 25, 2015 election:

Ushahidi Crowdmap Traffic (Sept 16 – Dec. 1, 2015)

Figure 3.7: Visits to the Ushahidi mapping platform between Sept. 16, 2015, and Dec. 1, 2015168

In an article for the organization Democracy in Africa, Alina Rocha Menocal notes
that “In principle, ICTs can profoundly democratize the public sphere because they make
it possible for everyone, not just those perceived to be elites, to contribute to and shape
ongoing debates.”169 In terms of election observation, this is crucial as traditional
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international election observation has failed to restrict the increase in election fraud in
countries like Tanzania. During the 2015 election, international election monitoring bodies
were unable to evaluate the ways in which the CCM ultimately manipulated the election in
their favor as they only observe election day itself rather than the campaign and election
period.170 Crowdsourced election observation further differs from traditional monitoring
bodies in that the near-real-time mapping of incidents allows for greater citizen
preparedness and engagement during the election period.171
The Uchaguzi platform helped contribute to the relative success of the opposition
party during the 2015 election. Unfortunately, seeing the potential for digital technologies
to promote democratic practices that strengthen political opposition, the CCM took reactive
measures to limit the ability for citizens and activists to utilize ICTs for such ends.
Ultimately, “Civil society’s traditional role of mobilizing citizens to participate in and
engage with electoral processes in Tanzania was severely constrained in the 2020 election
both by law and in practice.”172 As a result of numerous technological and sociopolitical
actions taken by the CCM between the 2015 election and the 2020 election, the Uchaguzi
platform was not available during the 2020 general election.
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Countering Digital Democracy
Over the past two decades, the African continent has been home to some of the
most rapid and widespread mobile phone adoption in the world. This ‘mobile revolution’
elicited excitement from many scholars early on, as it was initially believed that the mere
presence of mobile phones would promote democracy throughout the region. 173 However,
it has become increasingly evident that this early excitement was wrongly placed. Rather
than widespread democratization, more and more countries on the continent are witnessing
the use of digital tools to extend authoritarian practices into online spaces.174
First and foremost, digital autocrats seek to control the flow of information in order
to manage perceptions and influence narratives. Secondly, digital autocrats seek to limit
the population’s ability to communicate to restrict the circulation of opposing views.175 As
noted by scholar Charlotte Cross, the ways in which the Tanzanian ruling party has sought
to control the flow of information around elections “can be understood in terms of the
extension into online spaces of partisan policing practices that have underpinned the
electoral dominance of CCM since the 1960s.” 176 Following the 2015 election in which the
CCM won by its narrowest margin of victory, these policing efforts have increased
demonstratively in scale.
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Six months prior to the 2015 general election, then-President Jakaya Kikwete
signed into law the Cybercrimes Act of 2015, initiating the first in a long series of pieces
of legislation that have steadily chipped away at Tanzanians’ digital rights and freedom of
expression. On the surface, the law serves to protect the Tanzanian economy from
cybercrimes that cost the economy nearly $100 million yearly. However, the law also
contains “broad clauses prohibiting dissemination of ‘false, deceptive, misleading, or
inaccurate information’ or content ‘intended to defame, threaten, abuse, insult’ and gives
police wide powers to seize electronic equipment” and has thus largely been used to police
content online.177 In practice, this language provides the government in power – the CCM
– with the legislative tools necessary to determine what can and cannot be legally posted
online and by whom. Taking this a step further, in 2018, Magufuli’s government passed an
amendment to the law requiring that all cybercafes install CCTV cameras. 178
Along with the Cybercrimes Act, Kikwete enacted the Statistics Act of 2015. The
Statistics Act criminalizes the publication of information – statistical or otherwise –
“intended to invalidate, distort or discredit official statistics.” 179 A subsequent 2018
amendment made it illegal for citizens to publish statistics without approval from the state’s
National Bureau of Statistics and imposed penalties with a minimum of three years
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imprisonment or a fine of $4,451. 180,181 However, due to international pressure, Magufuli
walked back part of the amendment, enabling civil society groups to legally publish
statistics of their own in 2019. 182 As Cross notes: “False information clauses in the
Cybercrimes and Statistics Acts have been used to prevent independent collection,
dissemination and interpretation of data that might contradict government narratives or
threaten the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi’s (CCM), electoral success.”183 During
the 2015 general election itself, the CCM arrested 191 volunteers from the CCM’s main
opposition party after being suspected of disseminating what the CCM deemed to be
“inaccurate” election results via WhatsApp by citing the Cybercrimes Act and the Statistics
Act.184 Moreover, after the 2015 election, security services also raided the TACCEO’s data
center at the LHRC, charging 36 people with the 2015 version of the Cybercrimes Act and
confiscating 28 computers and 36 mobile phones.185 As the TACCEO and the LHRC are
non-partisan organizations, this was a strong move on the part of the CCM in response to
the www.uchaguzi.info.tz platform.
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In 2018, with his sights set on the impending 2020 election, Magufuli replaced the
Electronic and Postal Communications Act of 2010 with the much more robust and
expansive Electronic and Postal Communications Online Content Regulations Act of
2018.186 This law places sweeping regulations on an array of actors that contribute to the
creation of online content, such as online content service providers, Internet service
providers, users, etc.187 Moreover, the law provides the state’s Communications Authority
with the power to determine who is given licenses to publish content online. Although, the
$900 yearly licensing fee for content creators like bloggers has already discouraged many
from attempting to obtain a license. Publishing content online without such a license is
classified as a criminal offense under the law.188,189 Prohibitive fees such as this serve to
directly counteract the Internet’s lowering of the cost barrier to participation in political
discourse. Joy Chelagat, a Media Business Advisor for Africa at Internews, said: “While
online media organizations have the potential of being alternative sources of impartial
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reporting due to their ownership structures, recent state and regulator actions have caused
some to shy away from content that may be deemed critical to the state.” 190
After activists in Tanzania took to Twitter demanding the presence of an
independent electoral commission leading up to the 2020 election, President Magufuli
responded by adding an amendment to the 2018 law, which now explicitly prohibits
“content that is involved in planning, organizing, promoting or calling for demonstration,
marches or the like which may lead to public disorder.” 191 With each attempt taken by
activists and citizens to use the opportunities afforded to them by digital technologies to
push back against the state’s increasingly draconian regulation of the information
ecosystem, the government reacts with the legislative tools at their disposal to strip away
the potential for successful opposition campaigns. In his efforts to further reverse the
narrowing trajectory of the CCM’s margin of electoral victory, prior to the 2020 election,
Magufuli “effectively shut out independent election observation and monitoring by
denying organizations and freezing the bank accounts of large civil society coalitions.”192
International monitoring bodies such as the European Union (EU) were not permitted to
observe the 2020 election.193

190. Joy Chelagat, “The Impact of Digital Media Regulation – an East African Case
Study,” Internews, January 25, 2021 https://internews.org/story/impact-digital-mediaregulation-east-african-case-study/
191. Paradigm Initiative, “LONDA: Tanzania Digital Rights and Inclusion 2020 Report,”
A Paradigm Initiative Publication (April 2021), 3.
192. Tanzania Elections Watch,“Final Observations Report on the General Election Held
in Tanzania on October 28, 2020,” 7.
193. Deutsche Welle, “Tanzania Restricts Social Media during Election,” DW, last
updated October 29, 2020. https://www.dw.com/en/tanzania-restricts-social-mediaduring-election/a-55433057.
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Leading up to and during the 2020 general election, the CCM enacted a series of
network disruptions to limit the ability of citizens to share information about the election.
Magufuli instructed the Tanzanian Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) to take
a series of measures:
Platform shutdown

Leading up to and during the election (specifically the
night before), major communication platforms were
blocked including WhatsApp, Twitter, Instagram, and
Facebook194,195,196

Website blocking

Websites reporting on election fraud and other
election-related events were blocked 197

Internet Throttling

Leading up to the election, it was reported that the
government slowed down Internet connection to
minimize citizen’s ability to access information 198,199

SMS shutdown

The TCRA was instructed to shut off bulk SMS and
bulk voice calls from October 24, 2020 until November
11, 2020200,201

194. The World staff, “Tanzania’s Internet Restrictions during Election Are ‘despicable,’
Digital Rights Activist Says,” The World, last updated October 28, 2020.
https://theworld.org/stories/2020-10-28/tanzanias-internet-restrictions-during-electionare-despicable-digital-rights.
195. Welle, “Tanzania Restricts Social Media during Election.”
196. Tanzania Elections Watch,“Final Observations Report on the General Election Held
in Tanzania on October 28, 2020,” 10.
197. The World staff, “Tanzania’s Internet Restrictions during Election Are ‘despicable,’
Digital Rights Activist Says.”
198. The World staff, “Tanzania’s Internet Restrictions during Election Are ‘despicable,’
Digital Rights Activist Says.”
199. GV Sub-Saharan Africa, “Internet Throttling, SMS Blocking in Days Leading up to
Election in Tanzania,” Global Voices, last updated October 27, 2020.
https://globalvoices.org/2020/10/27/internet-throttling-sms-blocking-in-days-leading-upto-election-in-tanzania/.
200. GV Sub-Saharan Africa, “Internet Throttling, SMS Blocking in Days Leading up to
Election in Tanzania.”
201. Tanzania Elections Watch,“Final Observations Report on the General Election Held
in Tanzania on October 28, 2020,” 41.
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Content filtering

It was reported that the government ordered the TCRA
to filter and censor keywords related to the election and
opposition candidates leading up to and during the
election202

Although unable to take any counter measures to the network disruptions, platforms able
to measure network connectivity in Tanzania during the election shared information:

Figure #: Twitter Public Policy reports network disruption of their platform in Tanzania.203

202. GV Sub-Saharan Africa, “Internet Throttling, SMS Blocking in Days Leading up to
Election in Tanzania.”
203. Welle, “Tanzania Restricts Social Media during Election.”
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Figure #: Independent Internet monitoring organization, NetBlocks, shares information on Twitter about
network disruptions during the 2020 election.204

204. “Internet disrupted in Tanzania on eve of general elections,” NetBlocks, last upladed
October 27, 2020. https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-disrupted-in-tanzania-on-eve-ofpresidential-elections-oy9abny3
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Figure #: Ugandan media outlet, The Observer, reports on the suspension of bulk SMS and voice calls near
the 2020 general election in Tanzania.205

The Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations of 2020
provide the TCRA with the legal ability to block and filter content but not the ability to

205. GV Sub-Saharan Africa, “Internet Throttling, SMS Blocking in Days Leading up to
Election in Tanzania.”
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enact a full network shutdown.206 However, these partial measures, in concert with the
legislative measures enacted between the 2015 and 2020 elections, have created an
environment of self-censorship in which citizens fear the potential consequences of voicing
their true opinions in digital spaces. 207 The resulting effect is that civil society organizations
and citizens are limited not only by state laws but also by a “pervading sense of
paranoia.”208 As a result, the CCM has risen back to its original position of power, winning
the 2020 election with 80% of the vote as “Severe government suppression has left the
political opposition, civil society, and media weakened, undercutting an effective domestic
countermove.”209

Conclusion
Over the past two decades, there has been a significant amount of missed placed
optimism about the potential for digital technologies to transform governance in SubSaharan Africa. As has been made evident throughout both case studies, the
transformative impact of digital technologies depends on people. Despite Uchaguzi’s
innovative approach to electoral accountability, the absence of robust support

206. GV Sub-Saharan Africa, “Internet Throttling, SMS Blocking in Days Leading up to
Election in Tanzania.”
207. Khamis Mutwafi, “What Google Trends Data Can Tell Us About the Tanzanian
Election,” Democracy in Africa, last updated December 11, 2020.
http://democracyinafrica.org/what-google-trends-data-can-tell-us-about-the-tanzanianelection/.
208. James Marchant, Tom Ormson, Ashnah Kalemera, Juliet Nanfuka Nakiyini,
Wairagala Wakabi, et. al. “Safeguarding Civil Society: Assessing Internet Freedom and
the Digital Resilience of Civil Society in East Africa.” Small Media, CIPESA, Digital
Defenders, and CIPIT, (2017): 67.
209. Marielle Harris, “A No-Confidence Vote in Tanzania’s Upcoming,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies, last updated October 26, 2020.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/no-confidence-vote-tanzanias-upcoming-elections.
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mechanisms for digitally enabled advocacy left civil society organizations without the
capacity to operate under increasingly repressive contexts.
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CHAPTER 4: LIMITING FACTORS AND
OPPORTUNITIES
As the cases of Egypt and Tanzania illustrate, the tension between non-democratic
states and the potential for digital technologies to promote democratic practices is not
straightforward. Deibert and Rohozinki provide a clear and impactful articulation of this
notion:
Rather than being an ungoverned realm, cyberspace is perhaps best likened to a
gangster-dominated version of New York: a tangled web of rival public and private
authorities, civic associations, criminal networks, and underground economies.
Such a complex network cannot be accurately described in the one-dimensional
terms of ‘liberation’ or ‘control’ any more than the domains of land, sea, air, or
space can be. Rather, it is composed of a constantly pulsing and at time erratic mix
of competing forces and constraints.210
The case studies in this thesis enable the identification of a series of limiting factors
contributing to the narrowing potential for digital technologies in democratic advocacy.
However, these case studies also allow for the identification of strategic opportunities for
the international community, civil society, local activists, private sector companies,
technologists, and citizens to engage in the promotion of digital rights that enable digital
technologies to promote democratic practices under non-democratic regimes-- alongside
the identified limiting factors.

210. Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski, “Liberation vs. Control: The Future of
Cyberspace,” in Liberation Technology: Social Media and the Struggle for Democracy,
ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press
and the National Endowment for Democracy, 2012), 20-21.
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This clash between repressive states and liberation technologies is not new in nature
but rather part of a larger perennial global battle for freedom. 211 While non-democratic
regimes are pushing back against the potential of liberation technologies, there are
responsive step that can be taken in order to reclaim digital technologies as tools for
democratization. However, as agreed by Diamond “it is not technology, but people,
organizations, and governments that will determine who prevails.” 212

Limiting Factors
1. The failure of the international community
As non-democratic states have usurped digital technologies for their own benefit,
violating citizen’s digital rights in the process, the international community has failed to
respond. In seeing that their actions lack consequences, regimes have become more brazen
in their efforts to clamp down on the potential for digital technologies to promote
democratic practices. Action by the international community in response to digital rights
violations is crucial to the sustainability of democracy on a global scale as “accountability
structures work via incentives that, in turn, depend on the possibility of sanctioning.” 213
Absent such incentives, other regimes will continue to replicate the actions of states like
Egypt and Tanzania.

211. Larry Diamond, “Liberation Technology,” in Liberation Technology: Social Media
and the Struggle for Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Maryland:
The Johns Hopkins University Press and the National Endowment for Democracy, 2012),
16.
212. Diamond, “Liberation Technology,” 16.
213. Steven Livingston, “Conclusion,” in Bits and Atoms: Information and
Communication Technology in Areas of Limited Statehood, ed. Steven Livingston and
Gregor Walter-Drop (London: Oxford University Press, 2014), 161.
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When the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) in 1948, it was the first-time international consensus had been used to
outline a concrete series of fundamental human rights that should be protected and
promoted on a universal basis.214 Today, UDHR is the foundation upon which all
international laws and standards rest. 215 While by definition a declaration is not binding,
declarations such as UDHR do hold states to certain aspirational standards. 216 It should be
the responsibility of the international community to hold countries accountable for such
human rights obligations.
With respect to digital rights – which are merely human rights in the digital realm217
– there are two crucial Articles that directly relate to the potential for digital technologies
to promote democratic practices under non-democratic regimes. 218
•

Article 12: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.”219

214. UN General Assembly, "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," 217 (III) A
(Paris, 1948).
215. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” Amnesty International
https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/universal-declaration-of-human-rights/
216. “Glossary,” United Nations Treaty Collection,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Overview.aspx?path=overview/glossary/page1_en.xml#decla
rations
217. Rosamond Hutt, “What are your digital rights?” World Economic Forum, last
updated November 13, 2015 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/11/what-are-yourdigital-rights-explainer/
218. Bolding of text was included for emphasis and is not present on UDHR document
219. UN General Assembly, "Universal Declaration of Human Rights."
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•

Article 19: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers.”220

Apart from Article 12 and 19, which protect more specific digital rights related issues, it is
imperative that three other Articles are promoted for digital rights to matter for the
promotion of democratic practices.
•

Article 20: “Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and
association”221

•

Article 21: “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government;
this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free
voting procedures.”222

•

Article 30: “Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.” 223

In 2016, the UN took explicit action to address digital rights under UDHR by
passing a resolution on “the promotion, protection, and enjoyment of human rights on the

220. UN General Assembly, "Universal Declaration of Human Rights."
221. UN General Assembly, "Universal Declaration of Human Rights."
222. UN General Assembly, "Universal Declaration of Human Rights."
223. UN General Assembly, "Universal Declaration of Human Rights."
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Internet.”224 As part of this resolution, the Human Rights Council (HRC) provided 15
recommendations of which several are central to the potential for digital technologies to
promote democratic practices under non-democratic regimes.
•

“Affirms that the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online,
in particular freedom of expression, which is applicable regardless of frontiers and
through any media of one’s choice, in accordance with articles 19 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights”225

•

“Calls upon all States to address security concerns on the Internet in accordance
with their international human rights obligations to ensure protection of freedom of
expression, freedom of association, privacy and other human rights online,
including through national democratic, transparent institutions, based on the rule of
law, in a way that ensures freedom and security on the Internet so that it can
continue to be a vibrant force that generates economic, social and cultural
development.”226

•

“Condemns unequivocally all human rights violations and abuses, such as torture,
extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances and arbitrary detention, expulsion,
intimidation and harassment, as well as gender-based violence, committed against

224. UN General Assembly, "The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights
on the Internet," A/HRC/32/L.20 (Geneva, 2016).
225. UN General Assembly, "The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights
on the Internet."
226. UN General Assembly, "The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights
on the Internet."
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persons for exercising their human rights and fundamental freedoms on the Internet,
and calls on all States to ensure accountability in this regard.” 227
•

“Condemns unequivocally measures to intentionally prevent or disrupt access to or
dissemination of information online in violation of international human rights law
and calls on all States to refrain from and cease such measures.” 228

While UDHR is non-binding, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) is a binding agreement. The ICCPR includes key articles from UDHR:
ICCPR Article 17 is UDHR Article 12, ICCPR Article 19 is UDHR Article 19, and ICCPR
Article 21 is UDHR Article 20. 229 To date, 173 countries have either ratified or accepted
accession to the ICCPR. This includes Egypt which ratified the ICCPR on January 14,
1982, and Tanzania which accepted accession to the ICCPR on June 11, 1976. 230 However,
action has not been taken by the international community for violations of ICCPR with
respect to digital rights. In 2019, a report by the Human Rights Council asserted that
“network shutdowns are a clear violation of international law and cannot be justified in any
circumstances.”231 Both Egypt and Tanzania have thus clearly violated international law as

227. UN General Assembly, "The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights
on the Internet."
228. UN General Assembly, "The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights
on the Internet."
229. UN General Assembly, “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” 2200
(XXI) A (New York, 1966).
230. UN General Assembly, “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”
231. “Internet shutdowns and elections handbook,” Access Now, last updated April 2021
https://www.accessnow.org/internet-shutdowns-and-elections-handbook/
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per the ICCPR for their respective Internet shutdowns, yet no action has been taken as of
writing.
The ICCPR’s First Optional Protocol (ICCPR-OP1) is the only real enforcement
mechanism available to hold states accountable for violations. While the treaty is legally
binding, for countries like Tanzania who have opted out of OP1, meaningful consequences
for violations don’t exist.232 Hypothetically, the treaty allows for the recognition of interstate complains but only in cases where both states have aggreged to accept such
complaints.233 Although this feature is largely insignificant as the Human Rights Council
(HRC), the UN body who would process such claims, has never received an inter-state
complaint regarding ICCPR violations.234 The HRC can censure states they deem to be
commiting human rights abuses. However, they have been hesitant to do so in recent years,
enabling UN member states with poor human rights records to proceed without
interference.235 While the censuring of states does not necessarily mean anything in
concrete terms, it does provide an avenue for potential action. Human Rights Watch’s UN
Representative, Joanna Weschler, has said that the HRC’s lack of action in this respect is
tantamount to “a frontal attack on one of the most effective human rights tools: the naming
and shaming of human rights violators.” 236 Not only should censures be exercised more

232. “Treaty Bodies Treaties,” TreatyBody, OHCHR.
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=186
&Lang=EN.
233. OHCHR, “Civil and Political Rights: The Human Rights Committee: Fact Sheet No
15 (Rev. 1),” 27.
234. OHCHR, “Civil and Political Rights,” 27.
235. “U.N.: Many Countries Escape Censure,” Human Rights Watch, last updated April
19, 2002. https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/04/19/un-many-countries-escape-censure.
236. U.N.: Many Countries Escape Censure,” Human Rights Watch.

78

seriously by the HRC, but censures should be paired with specific actionable responses or
leaders on the international stage should respond to by imposing targeted sanctions on
states censured by the HRC in response to ICCPR violations.
In September 2021, the Biden administration took a small step for the U.S. in terms
of global leadership on the matter by cutting military aid to Egypt in half (releasing $130
million of the typical $300 million) on account of human rights violations (of which digital
rights make up a small part). Since coming to power in 2013, General Sisi has not faced
any retribution by the U.S. for his human rights record until now. However, as Bobby
Ghosh said in an opinion piece for The Washington Post, “at best, Biden is slapping Sisi
with a wet noodle”237 as the withheld direct financial support is only a small fraction of the
total military aid allocated to Egypt by the U.S. every year and will likely have little impact
on Sisi’s actions regarding human rights abuses.238 19 civil society organizations came
together to voice their conviction that this insubstantial slap on the wrist effectively “gives
license to the Egyptian government to continue perpetrating egregious human rights
violations without fear of repercussions.”239 As a leader on the international stage, the
United Sates must do more to hold governments accountable for ICCPR violations and
nonobservance of UDHR standards.
Ultimately, the issue is not with the current international human rights standards set
about by the UN as they are robust and comprehensive. Rather, as Access Now’s Executive

237. Bobby Ghosh, “Joe Biden Get (Not Too) Tough on Egypt,” The Washington Post,
last updated September 16, 2021 https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/joe-bidengets-not-too-tough-on-egypt/2021/09/16/e8588d86-16c4-11ec-a019cb193b28aa73_story.html
238. Ghosh, “Joe Biden Get (Not Too) Tough on Egypt.”
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Director, Brett Solomon, said in December of 2020, “Our problem is once again application
and implementation. And this is where there has been failure and will continue to do so
unless we move fast, firm, and honestly.”240

2. Private sector companies profit from digital authoritarianism
In the past two decade, a highly profitable commercial market for digital censorship
and surveillance technologies has emerged. As a response to the needs of non-democratic
regimes seeking to suppress the ability of digital technologies to promote democratic
practices, private sector companies have innovated highly specialized technologies—in
effect, exporting digital authoritarian capabilities to any state willing to pay. 241
The most notorious among these private sector companies is the Israeli firm NSO
Group and the set of surveillance tools that fall under the umbrella of their Pegasus Project.
Between 2016 and 2021, Pegasus spyware has been found in over 46 different countries,
targeting thousands of journalists, activists, opposition leaders, lawyers, and
diplomats.242,243 Following Saudi Arabia’s killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018,

240. Brett Solomon, “Can human rights survive the digital age? Only if we do these
things,” Access Now, last updated December 10, 2020
https://www.accessnow.org/human-rights-in-the-digital-age/
241. Adrian Shahbaz and Allie Funk, “Freedom on the Net 2021,” Freedom House
(2021) https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2021/global-drive-control-big-tech
242. Access Now Team, “Two years after Khashoggi’s slaying, no accountability for
spyware firm or Saudi government,” Access Now, last updated October 1, 2020
https://www.accessnow.org/khashoggi-two-years-later/
243. Access Now Team, “From India to Rwanda, the victims of NSO Group’s WhatsApp
hacking speak out,” Access Now, last updated December 17, 2020
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it was found that Pegasus had been sold to Saudi Arabia and had been used to track and
spy on Khashoggi leading up to his killing. 244
In addition to NSO Group, Allot is another Israeli firm profiting from digital
authoritarianism.
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telecommunications operators and its internet service providers install Allot’s Internet
filtering tool in order to censor digital content prior to the election. 245 However, Israel’s
NSO Group and Allot are not the only perpetrators. The UK’s Gamma Group, Italy’s
Hacking Team, Germany’s FinFisher, and the French firm Amesys have each sold various
censorship and surveillance technologies to regimes seeking to thwart dissent. 246,247
Western governments can help by enacting restrictions or regulations on the sale and
purchase of such technologies emerging within their own borders.248,249

244. Access Now Team, “Two years after Khashoggi’s slaying, no accountability for
spyware firm or Saudi government.”
245. Felicia Anthonio, Bridget Andere, and Sage Cheng, “Tanzania is weaponizing
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authoritarianism across Africa,” Brookings Institution, Tech Stream, last updated
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248. Larry Diamond, “Liberation Technology,” in Liberation Technology: Social Media
and the Struggle for Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Maryland:
The Johns Hopkins University Press and the National Endowment for Democracy, 2012),
15.
249. It is important to note that companies within liberal democracies are not the only
ones developing such technologies. Both China and Russia have been instrumental in the
development and dissemination of censorship and surveillance technologies exported to
other non-democratic states. Countries like the U.S. could play a role here as well by
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Apart from companies themselves, investment firms in digital hubs like Silicon
Valley are profiting from digital authoritarianism. Prior to being purchased by the San
Francisco-based private equity firm Francisco Partners Management LLC, Sandvine Inc.
refused to sell their deep packet inspection tools to repressive regimes. 250 In an interview
with Bloomberg, Sandvine’s co-founder Don Bowman explained that they were concerned
with the actions that such sales could result in: “what that could lead to—we’re talking
about journalists vanishing, whistleblowers put in jail...we didn’t want to be part of that.” 251
Following Sandvine’s sale in 2017, Bowman and others were replaced and the decision to
refrain from such sales was reversed in favor of potential profits. 252 Countries like Egypt
have been identified as purchasing Sandvine’s deep packet inspection software. 253
Sandvine was not Francisco Partners’ first foray into the world of digital authoritarianism
as they had previously held ownership in NSO Group.254

3. It has become easier and less costly to restrict the flow of information
As the information is crucial to the promotion of democratic practices, regimes
seeking to prevent such actions attempt to obstruct the flow of information. The digital era

starting negotiations focused on mitigating exports of technologies that perpetuate digital
authoritarianism.
250. Ryan Gallagher, “Silicon Valley Investment Firm Profits From Surveillance States,”
Bloomberg Businessweek, last updated January 26, 2021
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has provided states with an increasing number of tools to interfere with the digital
information environment. Internet shutdowns have been a favorite tool of states attempting
to limit the potential for digital technologies to promote democratic practices. However, it
is no longer necessary for regimes to cut off access to the entire network. Rather, regimes
can now take a series of smaller, less economically and politically troublesome shutdown
measures that are nonetheless detrimental to the flow of information.
Types of network disruptions utilized by non-democratic regimes to mitigate the
potential for digital technologies to promote democratic practices: there is currently no
universal consensus on the specific terminology regarding the various types of network
disruptions utilized by non-democratic states, the definitions below incorporate and rely on
the general understanding among international civil society organizations (clarifying
terminology: internet shutdown, network shutdown, network disruption, etc.)
•

Blanket Internet shutdowns: refer to shutdowns in which the entire Internet is shut
off and inaccessible255

255. “Internet Disruption: Different Terms for Different Tactics,” Global Voices Advox,
last updated January 8, 2020. https://advox.globalvoices.org/2020/01/08/internetdisruption-different-terms-for-different-tactics/.
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•

Partial or platform-specific shutdowns: refer to situations in which some apps and
websites “targeted while other websites are still available for use.” 256,257,258

•

Mobile network (SMS) shutdowns: refer to the intentional shutdown of mobile
data259

•

Internet throttling: “refers to the intentional limitation of bandwidth which can be
translated into a limitation on the speed with which a set amount of data can
move.”260

Each type of network disruptions can be utilized by regimes to achieve different ends
as each provides its own unique cost-benefit calculation. Regimes can also decide to enact
types of shutdowns on a national or regional scale. 261 Full network blackouts are incredibly
costly for states but are most effective in achieving the end goal. While partial shutdowns
and Internet throttling are less detectable and therefore less costly, they are less successful

256. “Internet Disruption: Different Terms for Different Tactics,” Global Voices Advox,
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in suppressing democratic advocacy. Moreover, partial, or platform-specific shutdowns
have increasingly been used to not only target specific liberation technologies like social
media platforms, but also circumvention tools and VPNs like Tor.
As seen notably in the case of Tanzania, and increasingly in Egypt, among other nondemocratic states, the use of Parks and Thompson’s slow shutdown which refers to “an
ensemble of regulatory mechanisms implemented over time, which have the effect of
shutting down – whether by prohibiting, interrupting, or making too costly – online content
creation, including blogging, alternative news production, public archiving, and usergenerated content” is hugely impactful.262 By pursuing network shutdowns through this
method, the legal justification for shutdowns becomes harder for activists and the
international community to dispute. Forcing ISPs and Telcos to install censorship and
surveillance technologies, hand over subscriber data, and participate in network disruptions
by nationalizing sectors or threatening licensing agreements provides regimes with the
ability to exercise control over the flow of information. 263 Moreover, the economic
component of the slow shutdown phenomenon as presented by Parks and Thompson serves
to directly counter the potential of digital technologies brought about by the lowered cost
of collective action and organization they enable.

262. Lisa Parks & Rachel Thompson, “The Slow Shutdown: Information and Internet
Regulation in Tanzania From 2010 to 2018 and Impacts on Online Content Creators,”
International Journal of Communication vol. 14 (2020): 4289.
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4. The importance (and difficulty) of advocacy follow through under current conditions
As was made apparent by the trajectory of change following the Egyptian
Revolution, “while enhancing access to information is vital, it is not sufficient to effect
change.”264 Even under the best of conditions, the advancement of democratic practices
under non-democratic regimes requires sustained effort for digitally enabled change to
become engrained within society. 265 In 2013, Joseph Siegle wrote that: “the emergence of
ICT is not synonymous with greater accountability. Other steps in the process are required,
not least of which is the emergence of civil society organizations that can sustain a reform
campaign over the extended period that genuine change usually requires.” 266 However, the
extended reform campaigns that Siegle argues are required for durable change are not
without cost. Local activists and civil society organizations face a myriad of obstacles, both
in terms of financial barriers and increasingly in terms of technological and sociopolitical
obstacles from the state itself. As repressive regimes continue to shrink civic space and
increase the physical dangers associated with any form of opposition, international civil
society organizations can lend financial support to local activists and grass-roots efforts to
develop and carry out sustained efforts to strengthen the potential for digital technologies
to promote democratic practice.

264. Joseph Siegle, “ICT and Accountability in Areas of Limited Statehood,” in Bits and
Atoms: Information and Communication Technology in Areas of Limited Statehood, ed.
Steven Livingston and Gregor Walter-Drop (London: Oxford University Press, 2014), 72.
265. Siegle, “ICT and Accountability in Areas of Limited Statehood,” 72.
266. Siegle, “ICT and Accountability in Areas of Limited Statehood,” 73.
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Opportunities
1. The economic and human cost of suppressing the flow of information
It is extremely costly for governments to restrict the flow of information in terms
of economic growth as a lack of connectivity effectively shuts down the domestic economy
and negatively impacts international trade.267 Between January 1, 2019, and the time of
writing (November 29, 2021), network disruptions have cost the global economy an
estimated $16.9 billion. 268 The blanket Internet shutdown enacted by Mubarak during the
Egyptian Revolution is widely considered the starting point in a long series of costly efforts
to suppress the flow of information by regimes across the globe. While it very difficult to
measure the economic cost of network disruptions, it is estimated that Egypt’s five-day
blanket shutdown in 2011 cost $18 million per day for a total of $90 million. 269 Throughout
the course of Tanzania’s 2020 general election, the country experienced a total of 432 hours
of network disruption which cost the domestic economy $27.5 million and affected 14.7
million users. 270 However, the periods of network disruption in Egypt and Tanzania cost
menial amounts when compared with the longer and more persistent network disruptions
experienced under other regimes. In June of 2019, Sudan experienced a one-month long
shutdown that cost the country over $1 billion which is equivalent to almost 1% of the

267. “The economic impact of disruptions to internet connectivity,” Deloitte, (2016).
https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/GNI-The-EconomicImpact-of-Disruptions-to-Internet-Connectivity.pdf
268. Woodhams and Migliano, “The Global Cost of Internet Shutdowns.”
269. Parmy Olson, “Egypt’s Internet Blackout Cost More Than OECD Estimates,”
Forbes, last updated February 3, 2011.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2011/02/03/how-much-did-five-days-of-nointernet-cost-egypt/?sh=34f6043f4d49.
270. Woodhams and Migliano, “The Global Cost of Internet Shutdowns.”
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country’s total GDP. 271 In 2020, network disruptions in India totaled 8,927 hours, costing
an estimated $2.5 billion.

272

Activists and civil society organizations can use the

detrimental global and domestic economic costs of network disruptions to pressure the
international community to act as well as to discourage the use by repressive regimes.
However, the cost of network disruptions goes beyond the macro amounts of
economic loss. For those already under economic distress or living in a country that is
experiencing an economic crisis, network disruptions only serve create greater strain. 273
More broadly, network disruptions disproportionately impact vulnerable communities
already at a disadvantage. The detrimental effect that network disruptions have on sectors
of the economy reliant on mobile payment systems disproportionately impacts businesses
in the informal economy which is largely made up of women as well as impoverished rural
communities and small business owners. 274,275 For those living in areas with limited access
to health services, digital technologies such as the Internet and mobile phones are a crucial
tool through which to communicate with physicians and locate necessary treatments.

271. “Policy Brief: Internet Shutdowns,” Internet Society, last updated December 18,
2019. https://www.internetsociety.org/policybriefs/internet-shutdowns/.
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Tigray: Ongoing Internet Shutdown Tearing Families, Communities, Businesses Apart,”
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274. Sandra Aceng, “The Impact of Internet shutdowns on Women in Uganda,”
Internews, OPTIMA (August 2021): 2.
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During network disruptions, the lack of connectivity can prove to be life or death. 276,277
Additionally, researchers have found that network disruptions serve to interfere with
education by limit learning potential and access to scholarship opportunities. 278 Through
raising awareness about the true cost of network disruptions, activists and civil society
organizations can provide proactive and reactive information to better equip local
communities to combat and respond to network disruptions.

2. Success of online/offline combination
In studying cases of peaceful and sustained digitally enabled movements,
Muzammil Hussain and Philip Howard identify four distinct stages to successful protest:
•

Preparation phase: “involving activists’ use of digital media across time to build
solidarity networks and identification of collective identities and goals; an ignition
phase involving symbolically powerful moments that ruling elites and regimes
intentionally or lazily ignored, but galvanized the public.”279

•

Pro-test phase: “during which, by employing offline networks and digital
technologies, small groups strategically organized on large numbers; an

276. Khattab Hamad, “The Socio-Economic Impact of the Internet Shutdown in Sudan,”
Internews, OPTIMA (August 2021): 11.
277. Prince Kudakwashe Madziwa, “Effects of network disruptions on health service
delivery among private practicing physicians in Bulawayo Metropolitan Province,
Zimbabwe,” Internews, OPTIMA (August 2021): 21.
278. Hamad, “The Socio-Economic Impact of the Internet Shutdown in Sudan,” 12.
279. Muzammil M. Hussain and Philip N. Howard, “Information Technology and the
Limited States of the Arab Spring,” in Bits and Atoms: Information and Communication
Technology in Areas of Limited Statehood, ed. Steven Livingston and Gregor WalterDrop (London: Oxford University Press, 2014): 18.
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international buy-in phase, during which digital media networks extended the range
of local cover- age to international broadcast networks.”280
•

Climax phase: “during which the regime maneuvered strategically or carelessly to
appease public discontent through welfare packages or harsh repressive actions.”281

•

Follow-on information warfare phase: “during which various actors, state-based
and from international civic advocacy networks, compete to shape the future of
civil society and information infrastructure that made it possible.” 282

Importantly, Hussain and Howard’s framework combines both online and offline
components in the development and execution of successful movements. Other scholars
and researchers have made similar conclusions. Through capitalizing on the differing
affordances of online and offline collective action, activist networks increase
communication and widen participation.283
Particularly in the age of digital authoritarianism, it has become increasingly
important for digitally enabled collective action to include offline elements. As technology
is merely a faciliatory tool and cannot enact change on its own, the impact hinges on the
user. Established, offline activist networks using digital technology to increase
participation in collective action are best positioned to reap the benefits of the tools

280. Hussain and Howard, “Information Technology and the Limited States of the Arab
Spring,” 19.
281. Hussain and Howard, “Information Technology and the Limited States of the Arab
Spring,” 19.
282. Hussain and Howard, “Information Technology and the Limited States of the Arab
Spring,” 19.
283. Alina Rocha Menocal, “Digital Technologies and the New Public Square:
Revitalising Democracy?” Democracy in Africa, last updated February 23, 2021.
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available. When faced with network disruptions, movements are more likely to withstand
the regime’s attempt to quell mobilization if they are “reinforced by organized movements
that serve as a backstop.”284 International civil society organizations can provide
established local activist networks and advocacy groups with the skills and tools necessary
to advance the potential for digital technology to promote democratic practice within their
own communities.

3. Potential to use technical solutions to counter digital authoritarianism
In the past five years, the development of specific digital tools that enable the
circumvention of censorship, surveillance, and network disruptions have provided activists
and citizens more broadly with the capacity to continue benefiting from the potential for
digital technologies to promote democratic practices under non-democratic regimes. VPNs
and platforms that enable end-to-end encryption are forms of circumvention tools that
restore the affordances of anonymity to the information ecosystem. David Kaye, the former
UN Special Rapporteur for freedom of express explains that:
Both encryption and anonymity are fundamental to creating the privacy and
security necessary for free thought and expression. But too often they are described
as tools used by criminals and terrorists. While bad people and actors will always
make use of these tools, as with any morally neutral technology, the reality is,
activists, journalists, artists, and even law enforcement officials around the world
depend on encryption and sometimes anonymity to protect themselves and their
important work.285
284. Jan Rydzak, Moses Karanja, and Nicholas Oppiyo, “Dissent Does Not Die in
Darkness: Network Shutdowns and Collective Action in African Countries,”
Internetional Journal of Communication vol. 14 (2020): 4273.
285. Alberto Cerda Silva, “Protecting Free Speech in the Digital Age: Q&A with UN
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression,” Ford Foundation, last updated October
11, 2016. https://www.fordfoundation.org/just-matters/just-matters/posts/protecting-freespeech-in-the-digital-age-qa-with-un-special-rapporteur-for-freedom-of-expression/.
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As a response to the expansion of state’s surveillance capabilities, platforms that support
encryption have become the preferred method through which activists operate. However,
popular encryption-based platforms like WhatsApp have increasingly been among the first
platforms blocked during network disruptions. 286 Tor, a popular VPN, has also been added
to the common platforms blocked during shutdowns in recent months. 287 It is crucial that
technologist partner with activists to develop circumvention tools that function during
network disruptions without compromising data privacy. Without the ability to operate,
civil society and activist organizations cannot reliably continue to fight the rise of digital
authoritarianism.

4. Targeted advocacy and strategic engagement
Rakesh Rajani, a Tanzanian civil society leader and founder of the organization
Twaweza, was quoted saying, “Technology does not drive anything. It creates new
possibilities for collecting and analyzing data, mashing ideas and reaching people, but
people still need to be moved to engage and find practical pathways to act.”288 The greatest
pathway toward action against efforts to mitigate the potential for digital technology to
promote democratic practice is to find and identify areas for purposeful action offline.

286. Anthony Cuthbertson, “WhatsApp Worst Hit by Internet Shutdowns,” The
Independent, last updated January 8, 2020. https://www.independent.co.uk/lifestyle/gadgets-and-tech/news/whatsapp-down-outage-internet-shutdown-latest-updatea9275301.html.
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Interference, https://ooni.org/post/.
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Through targeted advocacy campaigns, strategic local engagement, and legal action, a
variety of actors can partake in combating the rise of digital authoritarianism.
Access Now’s #KeepItOn campaign is a global movement seeking to end the use
of Internet shutdowns, and is an example of a successful targeted advocacy campaign.
#KeepItOn utilizes an organized global coalition of 243 organizations from 105 countries
to document, report, and provide support to anyone involved in the fight against Internet
shutdowns.289 Resources like the #KeepItOn Advocacy Toolkit expand the success of the
movement as it utilizes a skills-based approach to expanding participation and provides
much needed resources to individuals and organizations navigating dynamics such as how
to continue election-related advocacy campaigns during an Internet shutdown.290
#KeepItOn has also been instrumental in the success of recent legal action against network
disruptions. Namely, the 2019 decision by Zimbabwe’s High Court that the government
had acted illegally when it shut down the Internet in response to opposition protests in
January of 2019.291,292 Moreover, Access Now and other civil society organizations and
activists utilize the success of the #KeepItOn hashtag and branding to raise awareness about
issues related to digital rights and Internet shutdowns such as the wrongful imprisonment
of activists, journalists, and opposition leaders. In particular, the momentum and far-reach
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of this type of global coalition is critical in the lead up to major events like elections when
digital rights violations are more frequent.
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CONCLUSION
The potential for digital technologies to empower citizens to mobilize for greater
accountability in governance, whether in response to corruption and police brutality or to
unfair elections, continues to develop as new innovative platforms like Ushahidi grow in
number by the day. At the same time, the ability for repressive regimes to utilize those very
same technologies to suppress the flow of information and shrink civic space has become
increasingly more advanced and subtle. Through seeking to reclaim agency over the fate
of digital technology, this thesis examines the potential for digital technology to promote
democratic practice under non-democratic regimes.
Firstly, a framework for conceptualizing the complex and dynamic intersection of
technology’s liberatory penitential and its repressive affordances was developed. In
affirming that technologies possess both primary and secondary uses, in which society
rather than the inventor creates the conditions for secondary uses, it was argued that the
very same technologies that give voice to democratic activists living under authoritarian
rule can and are being harnessed by their oppressors. Importantly, it is not the technologies
themselves, but people, organizations, and governments that will determine if democratic
or autocratic norms prevail.
This framework was applied to the cases of Egypt and Tanzania to examine the
ways in which digital technology’s liberating potential can be directly co-opted by the state
as a response to democratic advocacy. The case studies illustrated a parallel set of
technological and socio-political actions taken by states, all which were entirely reactive
in nature. Based on these findings, a concrete series of limiting factors and opportunities
contributing to the potential for digital technology to promote democratic practice under
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non-democratic regimes was identified. By using the limiting factors and opportunities
identified in this thesis, it was found that deliberate action can be taken to promote a rightrespecting digital framework that utilizes multi-lateral, cross-sectoral approaches to global
governance and digital rights– even under the current limiting conditions
However, as it stands, there is a huge inequality in who gets to participate. In
particular, the digital gender divide poses significant obstacles to the realization of this
potential, as enormous portions of the global population are left out of digitally enabled
democratic practice. If the digital gender divide can begin to shrink, and more women –
particularly young women – are able to gain the skills necessary to participate in the digital
world, the potential for digital technology to promote democratic practice under nondemocratic regimes is not just for those of us with optimistic tendencies.
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